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DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS IN FEDERAL COURTS
THE Harvard Law Review in a comment published in its April
issue, under the title "Declaratory Relief in the Supreme Court," 2
has undertaken to formulate a series of arguments designed to
indicate that the declaratory judgment, however well it may func-
tion in state courts, is, for certain reasons allegedly inherent in
the peculiar functions of the Supreme Court-the lower federal
courts seem to be overlooked-not well adapted to federal prac-
tice. The writer of the comment seeks to justify on extraneous
grounds the dicta of the Supreme Court in the Grannis and Will-
ing cases,2 where it was intimated that an action for a declara-
tory judgment does not present a "case" or "controversy," a
view which has elicited severe criticism from practically every
commentator upon those cases. The Harvard Law Review, while
apparently conceding the inadmissibility of the grounds for those
dicta advanced in the opinions, seeks to justify them nevertheless
145 HARv. L. REV. 1089.
2 Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Granmis, 273 U. S. 70, 47 Sup. Ct. 282 (1927);
Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U. S. 274, 48 Sup. Ct. 507 (1928).
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by suggesting that the Court may have "sensed the existence of
some strong reason which urged the undesirability of declaratory
judgments in federal practice." If the considerations which the
Review advances were really in the mind of the Court, it is un-
fortunate that they were not expressed in the opinions, for, as
Mr. Justice Brandeis has very recently said, the judicial authority
of the Court must "depend altogether on the force of the reason-
ing by which it is supported," 3
The inarticulate major premises supplying the occult explana-
tion for the Grannis and Willing dicta are suggested as the fol-
lowing: (1) that an issue presented in the federal courts for
declaratory judgment possibly lacks, for some reason not clearly
stated, the essential requisites of a "case" or "controversy;" (2)
that inasmuch as the Supreme Court deals largely with constitu-
tional cases and cases of statutory construction, it would be un-
fortunate to present these issues in the form of an action for a
declaratory judgment, because, forsooth, actions for declaratory
judgment involving statutes are assumed to be presented without
an adequate record of the facts or "experience of the actual op-
eration" of the statutes in question; and (3) that the declaratory
judgment requires "the determination in advance of the legal
consequences of every act," and that it would be inadvisable to
require the federal courts to'perform such a function: "Thus, if
the declaratory judgment works perfectly, there will be nothing
to prevent the presentation of all legislation to the Court immedi-
ately upon its passage. Needless to say, this will not only de-
prive the Court of an insight into the practical application of the
statute to the injury in question, but may also deprive it of the
experience to be gained from observing the results of conformity
to the statute."
We are reminded of the now overruled opinion of the 'Michigan
Supreme Court in the Anway case,4 in which the court remarked
that "it at once becomes apparent that by the Act the courts of
this State are made the legal advisers of all seeking such advice,"
and ended on a slightly hysterical note to the effect that "under
our government the State does not till our farms, manufacture
our autos, conduct our great department stores or do our law
business for us. The unfortunate people of one country are at
present trying such experiment in government." r
3 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 52 Sup. Ct. 443, 450 (1932).
4 Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry., 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350 (1920).
5The universal criticism which the Anway case evoked, in purporting to
entertain the assumption that the Act required or even permitted the court
to render advisory opinions or decide moot cases, caused a revulsion against
it, and other states in passing on the constitutionality of the declaratory
judgment-an issue which never should have been raised had it been under-
stood what a declaratory judgment was-declined to follow the Anway
case. Finally the Michigan Supreme Court in Washington-Detroit Theater
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The arguments advanced in the Harvard Law Revicw as a
rationalization of the Grannis and Willing cases have the disad-
vantage of proceeding on assumptions as to declaratory judg-
ments which have but little relation to the facts. We are after
all not in the field of speculation, for there is now an experience
of about 700 cases in the United States, and possibly 4000-5000
cases in England, Scotlandp Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
India, Germany, Austria and other countries. This experience
cannot be swept aside by imaginative fears; and when it is con-
sidered that the states of the United States, Australia, Canada,
and other English-speaking jurisdictions, not to speak of other
countries, use declaratory actions constantly for the purpose of
placing in issue the constitutionality or validity of statutes and
ordinances, and that statutory construction is one of the major
functions of the declaratory judgment, it seems strange that such
categoric conclusions should have been essayed without even an
attempt to examine this vast experience. The fears which have
induced so much whistling in the dark might then have been
dissipated.
In the first place it may be said that by no means the majority
of the cases before the lower federal courts present questions
involving the constitutionality or construction of statutes. Many
of them are of the equity and common law type which regularly
appear in the state courts. There is therefore no reason why liti-
gants in the federal courts should be deprived of those remedies
and forms of relief to avoid peril and insecurity which have
served the community so well in the state courts and in foreign
countries. In the second place, by possibly preventing, on grounds
which have not commanded high respect, the passage of an Act
giving the federal courts power to render declaratory judgments,
the Supreme Court would seem to have stepped not only beyond
its usual function of passing on the constitutionality of statutes
after enactment, but it has in effect limited state jurisdiction by
serving notice that actions for a declaratory judgment in the
state courts cannot be appealed to the Supreme Court, though
involving federal questions. In the third place, it is romancing
to assume that the Supreme Court now delays a decision on stat-
utes until cumulative experience of their operation has aided its
Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich. 673, 229 N. W. 618 (1930), overruled the Anway
case, until now eighteen states stand unanimous on the issue of constitu-
tionality, eight of them subsequent to the federal dicta. Morton v. Pacific
Constr. Co., 36 Ariz. 97, 283 Pac. 281 (1929); Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla.
782, 128 So. 260 (1930); Zoercher v. Agler, 172 N. E. 186 (Ind. 1930);
Black v. Elkhorn Coal Corp., 233 Ky. 588, 26 S. W. (2d) 481 (1930);
Washington-Detroit Theater Co. v. Moore, supra; Faulkner v. City of
Keene, 155 Ati. 195 (N. H. 1931); City of Milwaukee v. Chicago N. W. Ry.,
201 Wis. 512, 230 N. W. 626 (1930); Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42
Wyo. 446, 296 Pac. 206 (1931).
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judgment, and it would indeed be unfortunate if litigants and the
public were to be left in the'dark as to the validity or interpreta-
tion of statutes for the long period which such a supposed re-
quirement might entail. But finally and more pertinently, the
assumption that actions for a declaratory judgment involving the
constitutionality or construction or interpretation of state stat-
utes are brought or decided without an adequate presentation of
the facts or prematurely is an assumption contrary to fact, which
the most casual examination of the cases in which such issues
have been presented for judicial determination would readily
have disclosed. While we shall discuss here only .cases which have
arisen in the United States, the American experience is confirmed
by the decisions of Australia and Canada, where issues involving
the constitutionality and construction of statutes regularly oc-
cupy the federal courts. We shall not stop to refute the unwar-
ranted Anway and Grnnis assumption.that a declaratory judg-
ment can be rendered in the absence of a "case" or "controversy,"
or consider the elements of justiciability, for these matters have
been sufficiently dealt with in recent articles.6
The Harvard Law Review suggests that the cautious grant of
injunctions by the federal courts is an indication of the Court's
feeling "that the experience of actual operation is necessary to
a satisfactory ruling." 7 The cases appear to have been misread.
Without undertaking to suggest that courts do or should pass
upon issues without an adequate presentation of facts warranting
and justifying a decision on the law, the cases cited merely indi-
cate that federal courts will not grant injunctions unless irrepar-
able injury is threatened and unless there is no adequate remedy
at law. Recourse to legal relief in state courts, in the absence of
irreparable injury, is generally, for citizens of the state, a condi-
tion of judicial relief in the federal courts on federal grounds.,
The supposed insufficiency of the facts was not in issue in these
cases. But the fact that injunctions were not issued in these cases,
for reasons quite different from that of an assumed lack of factual
G Borchard, The Constitutionality of Declaratory Judgments (1931) 31
COL. L. REv. 561; Ibid., Judicial Relief for Peril and Insecurity (1932) 45
HARv. L. REV. 793.
See Hurley v. Kincaid, 52 Sup. Ct. 267, 269 (1932); of. Irwin v. Dixion,
9 How. 10 (U. S. 1850); Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. State Corp. Comm.,
236 U. S. 699, 35 Sup. Ct. 480 (1915); Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U. S.
453, 39 Sup. Ct. 142 (1919); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445, 47
Sup. Ct. 681 (1927); Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. R., 274 U. S.
588, 47 Sup. Ct. 720,(1927); Mathews v. Rogers, 284 U. S. 521, 52 Sup.
Ct. 217 (1932); Stratton v. St. Louis S. W. R. R., 284 U. S. 530, 52 Sup.
Ct. 222 (1932).
s "The jurisdiction should be exercised only where intervention is essential
in order effectually to protect property rights against injuries otherwiso




experience, directs attention to the fact that the cumbersome and
expensive effort of litigants to invoke federal protection by in-
junction often serves to demonstrate the urgent need for declara-
tory relief. While the prayer for relief must be framed in equity
and while proof of the jurisdictional requisites of injunction is
demanded, requisites which often fail, what the plaintiff really
wants is a judicial declaration that the state law or the adminis-
trative action, state or federal, is invalidY A decision on this
question he should be enabled to obtain as quickly as feasible,
without, however, permitting additional interference by federal
courts with state jurisdiction. But the extraordinary efforts in
Hurley v. Kincaid to obtain by injunction a ruling on the question
whether the administrative officers were privileged without com-
pensation to endanger the plaintiff's land by overflow, requiring
five separate and inconclusive court arguments before the Su-
preme Court-without passing on the substantive issue-decided
that he was not entitled to an injunction, illustrates the excep-
tional inadequacy of federal procedure in the determination of
legal rights placed in issue between the individual and the ad-
ministration.0 It is hardly conceivable that in England or in any
other jurisdiction enjoying declaratory judgment procedure, such
an exhibition of judicial circuity would have been possible."'
9 athews v. Rogers, Straton v. St. Louis S. W. R. R., Hurley v. Kincaid,
all supra note 7.
:o Plaintiff landowner sought to enjoin the execution of any work on the
Boeuf floodway under the Mississippi River Flood Control Act, May 15,
1928, c. 569, 45 Stat. 534, and specifically the receiving of bids, etc., for
the construction of guide levees. The plan adopted by this statute so
changed the natural drainage that a greatly increased flow of water could
be expected in flood times through this floodway. Plaintiff's land was not
in the line of construction proposed by the plan but was within the pro-
posed channel of the floodway. The War Department advertised for bids
for the guide levees for the Boeuf floodway, the completion of which
project would require 10 years. Plaintiff contended that the scheme would
impose additional danger on his land and additional servitudes, and that
this amounted to a taking of his land. On a motion to dismiss, the Dis-
trict Court held that the United States was not a necessary party and
that the statute required the Government to condemn. 35 F. (2d) 235
(1929). Thereupon answer was filed, alleging that the administrative officers
did not consider it necessary to condemn plaintiff's land and that it in reality
received additional protection. The District Court held that the plan
proposed a taking and that, although physical occupancy would not occur
until the land had been overflowed in flood time, the taking began with the
construction of the first works under the plan and granted the injunction
which plaintiff sought. 37 F. (2d) 602 (1929). This was affirmed by the
Circuit Court of Appeals, 49 F. (2d) 768 (1931), but reversed by the
Supreme Court, supra note 9, who suggest that he might sue in the Court
of Claims to establish whether there has been a "taking."
"1 Jennings, Declaratory Judgments against Public Altdlrlties in Eng-
land (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 407-424. Particular attention may be called to
a recent English case, Ruislip-Northwood U. D. C. v. Lee, 145 L. T. R. 203
(K. B. 1931). In that case, administrative officers were authorized by stat-
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In the very next comment in the April issue of the Harvard
Law Review,""a on the "Statutory Extension of Injunctive Law
Enforcement," we find an exemplification of the social need for
the determination of issues arising between the individual and
the administration, involving the relative scope of individual
liberty and public restraint, a social need which has been met
by abusing the injunction in order to enable the courts to declare
and mark the line between permissive and prohibited private
conduct and public interference. The Harvard Law Review cor-
rectly calls attention to this departure from the historic function
of equity, but fails to observe that what has happened is an abuse
of injunction in order to obtain a declaration of rights, which
society and the individual find indispensable. The protest which
that abuse is arousing has already served to produce statutes
limiting the jurisdiction of courts of equity, whereas both the
evil and the remedy would have been unnecessary had it been
realized that judicial determination, not coercive injunction, was
the social need to be served. The narrow conceptions arising out
of an inadequate analysis of the theory and function of proced-
ure were responsible for a failure to note that the principal goal
sought was the declaration of rights, rather than the ancillary
writ of injunction. The prayer for injunction was merely an
instrument for obtaining a declaration of rights. Apart from the
fact that the United States Supreme Court, whose jurisdiction
is more restricted than that of the lower federal courts, has on
innumerable occasions rendered declaratory judgments," thus
refuting the protestations of lack of power, it has in recent years
on several occasions permitted the injunction to be used, or
abused, for the purpose of rendering a much needed declaratory
judgment, under circumstances where an immediate or irrepar-
able injury was not perceptible."3
ute to tear down "temporary buildings." A dispute arose between the ad-
ministrative officers and a landowner as to the nature of the buildings on his
* property, so, before proceeding to demolish the buildings, the officers sought
a declaration as to the nature of the buildings. In upholding a judgment
giving a declaration that they were "temporary buildings" within the mean-
" ing of the statute, Greer, L. J., said: "The present case is a case where the
wrong had in fact been done, and was continuing in existence at the date
the writ was issued, and if ever there was a case in which it is convenient
and right that there should be on the part of a plaintiff a right to a decla-
ration which will make it safe if he acts in accordance with his rights, that
is the present case."
ha (1932) 45 HIIARV. L. REV. 1096.
12 See cases cited in (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 561, at 586 and 596-7. See
also United States v. Smith, 52 Sup. Ct. 475 (U. S. 1932).
13 Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 44 Sup. Ct. 15 (1923); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 571 (1925) ; Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114 (1926). And see Miller v.
Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U. S. 498, 52 Sup. Ct. 260 (1932), where
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The Harvard comment, in its assumption that the difference
in the prayers between a declaratory judgment and an execu-
tory judgment implies some material difference in the operative
facts which would be presented in the record, undertakes to set
up a row of straw men which it proceeds ruthlessly to decapi-
tate. It says (p. 1095): "Where the dispute involves passing
upon legislation, the feasibility of which requires a nice balanc-
ing of benefit and detriment, a determination of its validity
after a single injury includes a pronouncement, in part at least,
as to the social value of acts prior to their occurrence. To the
extent that it goes beyond the field of factual injury presented
in the litigation, such a pronouncement is likely to be a mere
speculation as to policy on the part of the Court. The tendency
to limit judicial consideration to the subject matter in dispute
indicates a consciousness of the importance of entering as little
as possible into an advance determination of matters in which
the beneficial enlightenment of experience has not been presented
to the Court."
When a court declares legislation unconstitutional, it does so
only in a particular case and in the light of particular facts. It
is well known that the result of the issue of constitutionality
depends largely on the facts of the first case presented for de-
termination. Yet that is an unavoidable consequence of our
judicial system. The effect given to that decision in other cases
depends on extraneous factors. The court is not bound to apply
the decision to other facts, and, inasmuch as the statute is not
erased from the books, it may prove constitutional or unconsti-
tutional under other circumstances or at a different timeL The
court cannot refuse to pass upon the issue when properly raised,
because they regard the facts as presenting only one aspect of a
situation they would prefer to see presented in broader aspects.
They may limit their decision or its effects, expressly or by
implication, or may, if they can, decline to pass on the issue of
constitutionality by deciding the case on other grounds As to
what is "factual injury," that will depend on the circumstances
of the case. In the three recent cases cited," the mere passage
of statutes or ordinances deleteriously affecting the property
values or personal rights of the plaintiff were regarded as suffi-
ciently constituting a "factual injury" to warrant judicial relief.
In the Grannis case, the Kentucky court regarded a statute which
required the plaintiff under penalty to change his mode of doing
tax collection was enjoined thus limiting a statute in order to mahe a
declaration on validity. Cf. Note (1932) 45 HARV. L. Rllv. 1221.
'4 See Note, The Permanence of Constitutionality (1931) 41 YALE L. J.
1101-1105.
3. Supra note 13.
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business as an injury sufficiently factual to create justiciability.0
In some cases a denial or .challenge of the plaintiff's rights by
a qualified person creates a legal interest in judicial relief.
In other cases a more definite threat of injury to the plaintiff
may be necessary, for example, if a cloud on title is not dissi-
pated, it will reduce the value of plaintiff's land or impair other
privileges, wherefor proof or allegation of the existence of the
cloud creates justciability.17 In other cases, a danger of a crim-
inal penalty attaching to the performance of an act affords the
plaintiff a legal interest in the determination of the legality of
his status, position, or act.18 If Grove had been merely nominated
for the office of city commissioner of Wichita, an office closed
under penalty to a person in the employ of a railroad having
a franchise from the City, he would not have had a justiciable
16 Jewell Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Kemper, 206 Ky. 667, 267 S. W. 342
(1925). No threat to enforce a penal statute has usually been deemed
necessary as a condition of justiciability, but in the Grannis case there was
in fact a threat to enforce, for indictments had been requested, and the
plaintiffs also had combined their request for a declaration with a demand
for an injunction. Few dicta of the Supreme Court have been so vulner-
able to attack as that in the Grannis case.
17-The cloud on title may arise as a result of competing claims under the
same document. Corn v. Roach, 225 Ky. 725, 9 S. W. (2d) 1074 (1028)
(interest taken under a will by the widow); Jackson v. Ku Klux Klan,
231 Ky. 370, 21 S. W. (2d) 477 (1929) (son's interest under a will asserted
by his widow); Long v. Uhle, 8 D. & C. 671 (Pa. 1927) (widow's interest
under will, her devisee being the plaintiff); .Mullens v. Mullens, 5 Tenn.
App. 235 (1927) (devisee's interest under will, plaintiff grantee being
anxious to secure a loan).
It may arise as a result of building or contractiral restrictions on the
use of land. Strong v. Hancock, 201 Cal. 530, 258 Pac. 60 (1927) (pur-
chaser at foreclosure claimed a declaration that restrictions, breach of
which would work a forfeiture, were cleared by the forfeiture); Hess v.
Country Club Park, 2 Pac. (2d) 782 (Cal. 1931); Village of Grosse Point
Shores v. Ayres, 254 Mich. 58, 235 N. W. 829 (1931) (that conditions im-
posed by defendant in plaintiff's deed as to telegraph poles, water system,
etc., were void); Voegler v. Alwyn Improvement Corp., 247 N. Y. 131, 159
N. E. 886 (1928), r'ev'g 220 App. Div. 829, 222 N. Y. Supp. 918 (1928)
(that restrictions in deed creating easement in defendant's favor were not
enforpeable); One and Three South William Street Bldg. Corp. v. Gardens
Corp., 133 Misc. 790, 233 N. Y. Supp. 473 (1929), 232 App. Div. 58, 248 N.
Y. Supp. 743 (1931); McCarter v. New Rochelle Homstead Co., 139 Misc.
672, 249 N. Y. Supp. 23 (1931) (that defendant vendor, who no longer held
property in the neighborhood, had no interest in maintenance of restric-
tions) ; Garvin & Co., Inc. v. Lancaster County, 290 Pa. 448, 139 Atl. 154
(1927) (that plaintiff was entitled to build certain types of buildings with-
out regard for defendant's easement of light and air) ; Marmack v. Barwiek,
8 D. & C. 479 (Pa. 1926) (plaintiff seller relieved his fears and the doubts
of a title guaranty company and avoided the refusal of the defendant pur-
chaser to take title without a certain guaranty, by a declaration that a
restrictive covenant placed in an 1814 deed was personal).
18 State v. Grove, 109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82 (1921) ; Ruislip-Northwood
U. D. C. v. Lee, 145 L. T. R. 208 (K. B. 1931).
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issue, because he might not have been elected. He had an insuffi-
cient legal interest in a judicial decision. But after his election
to the office, it was perfectly legitimate for him or for the Attor-
ney General to raise the issue of his eligibility, instead of requir-
ing him first to enter upon the office, incur the criminal penalty,
and defend himself against a criminal prosecution. Slight ex-
amination will make it clear that in these cases there is no mere
speculation as to the effect of a statute, but that the validity or
construction of the statute is presented to the court in a factual
setting which enables the issue to be determined, not before the
issue is ripe for determination by reason of the non-accrual of
the necessary facts, but before the plaintiff has incurred a crim-
inal penalty or before violence has been committed. It seems
strange that this distinction appears to be so difficult to make.
The determination is not made in "advance" of experience of
facts but in "advance," if one will, of criminal act or violence
irretrievably impairing a status quo which should be preserved
and yet clarified by settling disputed issues. 1'
In passing upon statutes, the Supreme Court, like other courts,
may construe or interpret the statute or constitution from in-
ternal evidence of its meaning (in some factual setting) or may
apply the statute or constitution to a varied combination of ex-
ternal facts. 9 This second function, perhaps the more frequently
exercised, involves the application to complex facts of such con-
cepts or standards as due process, equal protection, interstate
commerce, reasonable, etc., and necessarily presupposes a full
presentation of the facts, the adequate appreciation of which is
the main element in the case. "In every such case the decision,
in the first instance, is dependent upon the determination of what
in legal parlance is called a fact, as distinguished from the decla-
ration of a rule of law." 20 It is these cases which apparently
have impressed the writer of the Harvard comment as inappro-
priate to decision by declaration, on the assumption that their
decision might be required on inadequate facts. To this assump-
tion, two answers may be made: (1) that by experience, declara-
tory actions have proved most congenial to rulings of law on
more or less undisputed facts and not to the application of stand-
ards to complicated or disputed facts; and (2) that the complete
discretion of the court over declaratory relief would enable it to
decline to pass upon complicated or disputed facts by declara-
Isa Cf. Note, Judicial Determination of the Validity of a Fedcral Tax
before Payment (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 1221.
39 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 52 Sup. Ct. 443, 448 (1932), in
dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J. See also FNKFuRTEna AND LANDIS,
TnE BusINEss OF THE SUPREME COURT (1927) 307 et seq.
20 52 Sup. Ct. 443, 448.
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tion. That appears to be the British practice.21 How many facts
are necessary in a particular case depends upon the nature of
the issue involved. In the Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, and Terrace v. Thompson cases, 21a it was only
necessary to show a statute or ordinance which injuriously
affected the plaintiff, having a concrete interest at stake. But in
no case can it be shown that a declaration was issued on facts
less adequate than would have been required for any other relief,
except for the dispensation from proof of committed violence or
breach. In all cases the procedural and substantive conditions
and prerequisites to invoke judicial protection must be present."
It is interesting to note that in Weigand v. Wichita, 3 involving
the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance as applied to the
plaintiff, the court in an action for a declaration demanded not
only ownership of the property by the plaintiff, but evidence that
he had applied for a permit to build; whereas this second require-
ment was waived by the Supreme Court in Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., though brought for an injunction.
An examination of the state cases in which statutes and ordi-
nances have been reviewed for constitutionality, construction, or
interpretation discloses that almost without exception they in-
volved issues of law, without any dispute as to the facts. Not
infrequently the case was dismissed for lack of a justiciable
controversy, either because of want of the necessary legal in-
terest in the issue on the part of the plaintiff or defendant 2 or
because the parties were not adverse in interest 21 or because the
facts were not sufficiently ripe for judicial decision, in which
event the judgment would merely have been an advisory
opinion 26 or because in the court's discretionary view, there was
21 "It is obvious that facts are in dispute, and that evidence would have
to be heard involving an investigation which, I think, puts the matter out-
side the category of applications to be brought before the court under
Order LIVa." F. Pratt Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Munitions, 127 L. T. 814
(Ch. 1922).
21a Supra note 13.
- See (1932) 45 HARv. L. REV. 793, 801.
23 118 Kan. 265, 267, 234 Pac. 978, 979 (1925).
24 Williams v. Flood, 124 Kan. 728, 262 Pac. 563 (1928); Purity Oats
v. State, 125 Kan. 558, 264 Pac. 740 (1928); Garden City News v. Hurst,
129 Kan. 365, 282 Pac. 720 (1929); In re Annexation of part of Lancaster
Township to City of Lancaster, 6 D. & C. 36 (Pa. 1925); Bell Telephone
Co. v. Lansdown Bros., 18 Dela. Cy. 307 (Pa. 1927) (plaintiff challenges
zoning ordinance, because he might want to buy in restricted area); Perry
v. City of Elizabethtown, 160 Tenn. 102, 22 S. W. (2d) 359 (1929).
- Crawford v. Favour, 34 Ariz. 13, 267 Pac. 412 (1928); Reese v. Adam-
son, 297 Pa. 13, 146 Atl. 262 (1929); Wagner v. County of Somerset, 96
Pa. Sup. Ct. 434 (1929); Public Defense Ass'n v. Allegheny County, 6
D. & C. 182 (Pa. 1925); Cummings v. Shipp, 156 Tenn. 595, 3 S. W. (2d)
1062 (1928).
26 Crawford v. Favour, supra note 25; Hayden Plan Co. v. Friedlander,
1204 [Vol. 41
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an absence of certain parties deemed necessary to the suit - or
because the court's judgment would not have finally settled the
issue 's or because the court was not in a position to make its
judgment effective. 9 The procedural and substantive requisites
of justiciability are evidently watched as closely in a suit for a
declaratory judgment as in a suit for any other form of relief.
It is, however, true that a citizen directly threatened with a
criminal penalty under a statute or ordinance may challenge the
validity of the legislation before he commits the forbidden act
and incurs the penalty.0 Whether such a suit is "premature"
depends upon the nature of the plaintiff's interest in an im-
mediate decision, and this criterion of "legal interest" of the
plaintiff is one of the major tests of justiciability in the states
and in foreign countries. To assume that justiciability is condi-
tioned upon prior violence or that to test the constitutionality or
construction of legislation it is necessary first to violate it, in-
volves a misconception of the judicial process, not sustained by
experience. 31 In non-declaratory procedure, a plaintiff contesting
the applicability or validity of restrictive regulations under the
police power need do no more than show that they in some gen-
eral way affect him deleteriously2 Yet it has already been ob-
97 Cal. App. 12, 275 Pac. 253 (1929); Lisbon Village District v. Town of
Lisbon, 155 Atl. 252 (N. H. 1931); cf. Mason's Adm'r i. Mason's guardian,
239 Ky. 208, 39 S. W. (2d) 211 (1931); In re Freeholders of Hudson
County, 105 N. J. L. 57, 143 Atl. 536 (1928); Lockwood v. Baird, 59 N. D.
713, 231 N. W. 851 (1930); Ladner v. Siegel, 294 Pa. 368, 144 AtI. 274
(1928).
Denver Land Co. v. Moffat Tunnel Impr. Dist., 87 Colo. 1, 284 Pac.
339 (1930); Coke v. Shanks, 209 Ky. 723, 273 S. W. 552 (1925); Addi-
tional Law Judge, 53rd Jud. Dist., 10 D. & C. 577 (Pa. 1928); Cummings
v. Shipp, 156 Tenn. 595, 3 S. W. (2d) 1062 (1928).
2SAdditional Law Judge, 53rd Jud. Dist., 10 D. & C. 577 (Pa. 1928).
29 State v. Board of Commissioners of Wichita County, 117 Kan. 162, 230
Pac. 531 (1924).
30 Little v. Smith, 124 Kan. 237, 257 Pac. 959 (1927); Pathci Exchange,
Inc. v. Cobb, 202 App. Div. 450, 195 N. Y. Supp. 661 (1922), aff'd, 236
N. Y. 539, 142 N. E. 274 (1923) (that plaintiff's "news reel" was not
subject to censorship); Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, Sheriff, 150 Tenn.
278, 300 S. W. 565 (1927); Utah State Fair Ass'n v. Green, 68 Utah 251,
249 Pac. 1016 (1926) (privileged to conduct horse race without danger of
prosecution).
31"They are not obliged to take the risk of prosecution, fines and im-
prisonment and loss of property in order to secure an adjudication of their
rights." Terrace v. Thompson, supra note 13, at 216, 44 Sup. Ct. at 18
(1923). See also Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 591, 593,
43 Sup. CL 658 (1923). See discussion and cases in 45 HARV. L. REV. '793,
839.
- (1) Building -regulations: Faulkner v. City of Keene, 155 Atl. 195
(N. H. 1931) (privilege to establish a filling station in building zone);
Rosenberg v. Whitefish Bay, 199 Wis. 214, 225 N. W. 838 (1929) (that
statute prohibiting building does not apply to plaintiff). (2) Other Regu-
lations concerning land: Spring Hill Cemetery Co. v. Lindsey, 162 Tenn.
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served that at least the Kansas courts have demanded definite
proof that a plaintiff seeking a mere declaration of the invalidity
of a zoning ordinance must do more than show general disadvan-
tage,33 but must show that he has taken steps to put the property
to the forbidden use.34 Not an uncommon form of declaratory
action against the Government is the claim of immunity from
the requirement of a license or fee as a condition of doing busi-
ness 3 or the claim of immunity from taxation or assessment,
involving statutory construction,36 a claim often difficult or haz-
ardous to assert by injunction or by awaiting enforcement pro-
ceedings or.a penalty, but readily susceptible of determination
by the speedy method of declaratory judgment. It may often
require an intelligent appreciation of the facts to determine
whether the plaintiff's interest is sufficiently ripe or concrete to
justify invoking a judicial determination on the constitutionality
or construction of a statute, but to assume that courts are unable
to draw the necessary distinctions is to challenge their intelli-
gence and to disregard tested experience in this very form of
procedure. While state cases are not always reported' as fully
as they might be, there is no evidence in the reports that courts
deciding upon issues of statutory constitutionality, construction,
420, 37 S. W. (2d) 111 (1931) (that burdens imposed for beautification
could not be imposed on plaintiff because statute unconstitutional). (3)
Business free from regulations: Jewell Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Kemper,
206 Ky. 667, 268 S. W. 342 (1925) (unsustained claim that statute regu-
lating business of warehousemen was unconstitutional); Dowdy v. City of
Covington, 237 Ky. 274, 35 S. W. (2d) 304 (1931) (administrative inter-
pretation of ordinance requiring registration of moving van operators, held
improper); Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, supra note 30 .(not subject
to pool-room regulations, because discriminatory). Cf. Louis K. Liggett Co.
v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105, 49 Sup. Ct. 57 (1928) (statute requiring
ownership of drugstores by pharmacists held invalid on injunction), with
Pratter v. Lascoff, 140 Misc. 211, 249 N. Y. Supp. 211 (1931) (declaratory
judgment), and Evans v. Baldridge, 294 Pa. 142, 144 At]. 97 (1928). But
see In re Haughes, 140 Misc. 811, 252 N. Y. Supp. 81 (1931).
3 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra note 13; of. Taylor v. Haverford
Township, 299 Pa. 402, 149 Atl. 639 (1930).
34 Weigand v. Board of Commissioners of Wichita, 118 Kan. 265, 234 Pac.
978 (1925); Hoel v. Kansas City, 131 Kan. 293, 291 Pac. 781 (1930).
35 American Trust Co. v. McCallister, 299 Pac. 319 (Ore. 1931) (privileged
to sell stock without public permit).
36 Wilcox v. Madison, 106 Conn. 223, 137 AtI. 742 (1927) (unsustained
claim that assessment was out of proportion to real value of property and
that classification was wrong). Cert. den., 276 U. S. 606 (1927); Cupp
Grocery Co. v. Johnstown, 288 Pa. 43, 135 Atl. 610 (1927) (plaintiff owner
of 33 stores claims liability to only one license tax of $100 as a corporation,
not $915 as assessed) ; Peoples Tel. Corp. v. City of Butler, 99 Pa. Sup. Ct.
256 (1930) (that lot and building necessary for plaintiff's business, hence
tax exempt); Frazier v. City of Chattanooga, 156 Tenn. 346, 1 S. W. (2d)
786 (1928) (claim that law permitting assessment on property owners
for improvements was repealed; denied). See also note 50.
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or interpretation have done so without an adequate presentation
or realization of the facts in a concrete setting.
Among the thirty-three state cases in which the constitution-
ality of statutes was placed in issue by declaratory action-sLx
of which were dismissed for lack of justiciability-th-ee involved
a threat of criminal prosecution,7 two, a denial of a license, oper-
ation without which would have entailed criminal responsibility, 3
five, statutes which, if valid, imposed on plaintiff a pecuniary
loss,-' six, taxpayers' actions challenging public acts or expendi-
tures,40 eight, actions by administrative officers to determine the
scope or legality of official duties under statutes,4' three, actions
challenging tax assessments. Among the cases in which the
validity of ordinances was attacked, apart from those dismissed
for want of justiciability, five were brought by taxpayers chal-
lenging the validity of municipal action, 43 four, by property
37 Path6 Exchange v. Cobb; Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buclmer; Utah
State Fair Ass'n v. Green, all supra note 30.
38 Pratter v. Lascoff; Evans v. Baldridge, both supra note 32. Cf. Alaska
Mexican Gold Mining Co. v. Territory of Alaska, 236 Fed. 64 (C. C. A.
9th, 1916), cert. den., 242 U. S. 648, 37 Sup. Ct. 242 (1917), in which the
court held that the plaintiff was in no position to complain until it had
applied for and been denied a license.
39 Hessick, Att'y Gen., v. Moynihan, 83 Colo. 43, 262 Pac. 907 (1927);
Little v. Smith, 124 Kan. 237, 257 Pac. 959 (1927); Jewell Tobacco Ware-
house Co. v. Kemper, supra note 32 (unsustained claim that statute regu-
lating business of -warehousemen was unconstitutional); Pettit v. White
County, 152 Tenn. 660, 280 S. W. 688 (1926); Spring Hill Cemetery Co.
v. Lindsey, supra note 32 (that burdens imposed for beautification could
not be imposed on plaintiff because statute unconstitutional).
4 0 MacDonald v. University of Kentucky, 225 Ky. 205, 7 S. W. (2d)
1046 (1928) (leasing power); Bloxton v. State Highway, 225 Ky. 324, 8
S. W. (2d) 392 (1928) (bond issue for the erection of bridges, payment
by tolls); Hesse v. Watertown, 232 N. W. 53 (S. D. 1930) (bond issue);
Lindsey v. Drane, 154 Tenn. 458, 285 S. W. 705 (1926) (election to ap-
prove statute on impounding straying animals); Newton v. Hamilton
County, 161 Tenn. 634, 33 S. W. (2d) 419 (1930) ; Simldn v. City of Rock
Springs, 33 Wyo. 166, 237 Pac. 245 (1925) (bond issue).
41 Adams v. Slavin, 225 Ky. 135, 7 S. W. (2d) 836 (1928) (duties and
compensation of judges); City of Owensboro v. Hazel, 229 Ky. 752, 1T
S. W. (2d) 1031 (1929); Wingate v. Flynn, 139 Misc. 770, 249 N. Y.
Supp. 351 (1931); Goetz v. Smith, 152 Tenn. 451, 278 S. W. 417 (1925)
(road statutes) ; Peters v. O'Brien, 152 Tenn. 466, 278 S. W. 690 (1925)
(statute regulating the salaries of county trustees) ; State Board of Exam-
iners v. Standard Engineering Co., 157 Tenn. 157, 7 S. W. (2d) 47 (1928)
(validity of statute and defendant's liability thereunder); Shipp v. Cum-
mings, 158 Tenn. 526, 14 S. W. (2d) 747 (1929) (statute varying dates
of tax collection); State ex rel. Bareham v. Graham, 161 Tenn. 557, 30
S. W. (2d) 274 (1930) (salary to office, several persons claiming).
- Wilcox v. Madison, supra note 36; Moore v. Lewis, 10 D. & C. 466
(Pa. 1928) ; North Tintic Mining Co. v. Crockett, 284 Pac. 328 (Utah, 1929).
43 Cannon v. Tempe, 36 Ariz. 12, 281 Pac. 947 (1929) (ordinance already
in existence on appointment of officer who had forfeited office); Davis v.
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owners or business men claiming to be adversely affected,44 two,
by cities claiming the invalidity of their own ordinances against
adverse parties,45 and one by an officer claiming the invalidity
of a resolution passed without his consent, as required by law .4
The numerous cases involving the constructfon or interpretation
of statutes embrace in the main actions by taxpayers or parties
more directly in interest challenging the validity of bond issues,
usually after the enactment of the authorizing legislation but
prior to the issue of the bonds,4 actions challenging the right of
administrative officers to refuse licenses or claiming immunity
City of Newport, 239 Ky. 610, 40 S. W. (2d) 281 (1931) (ordinance on
funding of floating debt); Bareham v. City of Rochester, 221 App. Div.
36, 222 N. Y. Supp. 141 (1927) (taxpayer's action-statute provided for
city-manager form of government); Macrum v. Board of Supervisors of
Suffolk County, 141 Misc. 358, 252 N. Y. Supp. 546 (1931); Lewis v.
Nashville, Gas & Heating Co., 162 Tenn. 268, 40 S. W. (2d) 409 (1931).
(several conflicting statutes on franchise brought in issue by administra-
tive ruling on rate base).
44 Hoel v. Kansas City, supra note 34 (for defendant; plaintiff had shown
no injury); Dowdy v. City of Covington, supra note 32. Taylor v. Naver-
ford, 299 Pa. 402, 149 Atl. 639 (1930) (zoning ordinance-actual sufferer,
as plaintiff had had offers only for forbidden use); Commonwealth Title
& Trust Co. v. Yeadon Bore., 19 Dela. Cy. 232 (Pa. 1928) (ordinance
required building to have light and air on three sides before building license
would be granted-plaintiff showed issuance of licenses violating this
rule since its passage).
45 City of Wichita v. Wichita Gas Co., 126 Kan. 769, 271 Pac. 272 (1928)
(validity of 1921 ordinance under which defendant had invested two million
dollars) ; City of Manhattan v. United Power & Light Corp., 129 Kan.
392, 283 Pac. 919 (1930) (ordinance under which defendant was operating).
46 Craig, City Comptroller v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, 208 App.
Div. 412, 203 N. Y. Supp. 236 (1924). Said the court: "It would be
difficult to find a more appropriate case for the application of the [declara-
tory judgments] law."
4 Pollard v. City of Norwalk, 108 Conn. 145, 142 Atl. 807 (1928) (plain-
tiff also sought injunction-case turns on compliance with statute on notice
of election) ; State ex rel. Enright v. Kansas City, 110 Kan. 603, 204 Pae.
690 (1922) (right of city to issue bonds without certain repayment clause
-turns on whether 1921 statute was additional or amendatory); State ex
rel. Baird v. Board of Commissioners of Wichita County, 117 Kan. 162,
230 Pac. 531 (1924) (bonds had been executed and registered but not de-
livered-had been the subject of prior actions in both state and federal
courts) ; Kirkpatrick v. City Bd. of" Education of Russelville, 234 Ky. 836,
29 S. W. (2d) 565 (1930); Bridges v. Scott County Bd. of Education, 235
Ky. 141, 29 S. W. (2d) 593 (1930); City of Sturges v. Christenson Bros.,
235 Ky. 346, 31 S. W. (2d) 386 (1930) (defendant-contractor with whom
plaintiff had made contract for water system; uncertainty arose because
of 1930 legislation); Holman v. Glasgow Graded Common Sch. Dist., 237 Ky.
7, 34 S. W. (2d) 733 (1931); Godsey v. Board of Ed. of Ludlow, 238 Ky.
17, 36 S. W. (2d) 656 Y1931); Douthitt v. Board of Trustees of Newcastle,
239 Ky. 751, 40 S. W. (2d) 335 (1931) (taxpayer sought declaratory judg-
ment re ordinance authorizing loan for debt payment for which taxes
could not be levied-turns on notice of authorizing election); Pace v. City
of Paducah, 44 S. W. (2d) 574 (Ky. 1931) (taxpayer's action).
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from license under the circumstances or contesting the scope or
meaning of the license,-8 actions demanding a clarification of
rights on the part of citizens or administrative officers thrown
into uncertainty in their legal relations with defendants by reason
of conflicting statutes,4  actions placing in issue liability to or
exemption from taxation or the interpretation of tax statutes in
their application to the plaintiff,0 actions involving the right to
43 Barlow v. Jones, 294 Pac. 1106 (Ariz. 1930) (scope of license-plain-
tiff contended it covered right to take fish and small game, and defendant
administrative officer only fish); American Trust Co. v. McCallister, Corp.
Com'r, supra note 35, Lackawanna County Undertakers' Ass'n v. State
Bd. of Undertakers, 11 D. & C. 503 (1928) (issue: "continuous" as including
exclusive-statute required 2 years' continuous employment-plaintiff con-
tended this meant exclusive and defendant administrative officers and ap-
plicants held contra); In re Templar Motor Car Co., 27 Dau. 270 (Pa.
1924) (license had been held necessary and had been refused-held, could
appeal from administrative decision or use declaratory judgment); State
Bd. of Examiners v. Standard Engineering Co., 157 Tenn. 157, 7 S. W.
(2d) 47 (1928) (plaintiff board claims defendant subject to its adminis-
trative control); Tennessee Eastern Elec. Co. v. Hannah, 157 Tenn. 582,
12 S. W. (2d) 372 (1928).
49 State ex rel. Enright v. Kansas City, 110 Kan. 603, 204 Pac. 690 (1922)
(effect of 1921 statute on powers of city to issue bonds without repayment
clauses--city proposed bond issue) ; School Dist. No. 19 of Sheridan County
v. Sheridan Community High School of Sheridan County, 130 Ran. 421, 286
Pac. 230 (1930) (plaintiff claimed discharge from guaranty as result of
new statute on community high school); Bartlett v. Lily Dale Assembly,
139 Mise. 338, 249 N. Y. Supp. 482 (1931) (stockholder's action to settle
questions as to defendant's corporate existence and their duties-in view of
statutes on voting passed after incorporation) ; Frazier v. City of Chatta-
nooga, supra note 36; Lagoon Jockey Club v. Davis County, 72 Utah 405,
270 Pac. 543 (1928) (plaintiff sought to determine whether old statute
against betting on horse races had been revived by repeal of statute pro-
viding for racing commission-threat of prosecution under old statute).
Between administrative officers: Lewis v. Coleman, 233 Ky. 266, 25 S. W.
(2d) 390 (1930) (plaintiff administrative officer sought declaratory judg-
ment against administrative officer--charged with financial duties-who
contended that certain legislation repealed the statute governing her salary
and reduced the salary); Campbell County Election Com. v. Weber, 42 S. W.
(2d) 511 (Ky. 1931) (action between election officers to ascertain which of
two statutes on same subject passed at same session governed their duties) ;
Easton Councilmen's Salaries, 8 D. & C. 752 (Pa. 1926) (action between
administrative officers to settle which of two ordinances governed the
salary to be paid plaintiff--each alleged different statute as guiding).
50 Washington County H. S. District v. Board of Com'rs of Washington
County, 85 Colo. 72, 273 Pac. 879 (1928) (right to make a levy in aid of
teachers' salaries); School Dist. No. 6, Rooks County v. Board of Com'rs
of Rooks County, 115 Kan. 631, 223 Pac. 818 (1924) (time at which statute
became effective-levy of taxes pending); City of Louisville v. Cromwell,
233 Ky. 828, 27 S. W. (2d) 377 (1930) (exemption from gasoline tax on
gasoline furnished city under contract); Haggerty v. Potter, 252 Mich.
460, 233 N. W. 380 (1930) ("wort"--and basis of tax in privilege tax on
malt extract or malt syrup or wort); Board of Education of City of
Rochester v. Van Zandt, 234 N. Y. 644, 138 N. E. 481 (1923) (tax status
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or the term of office 51 or to allowances and fees,5 2 statutory pow-
ers53 or private privileges or immunities under statute." In
none of these cases in which judgments were given can it be said
that insufficient facts were before the court or that, although the
issue was narrowed to the point actually in litigation, the decision
was made before justiciability was fully established.
It goes without saying that a court can and should always
refrain from deciding a particular issue before there is any
necessity therefor I and that it is the court's function to establish
in the case before it not only the existence of the procedural and
substantive preiequisites of justiciability,", but also the existence
in the record of sufficient facts to pass upon the issue and make
the decision res judicat, in the case. If there are insufficient
facts, the judgment may be withheld as in effect an advisory
of certain funds raised by city); Frank v. Lindsay, 156 Tenn. 456, 2 S. W.
(2d) 412 (1928) (liability to tax as auto tire merchant) ; Parmer v. Lind-
sey, 157 Tenn. 29, 3 S. W. (2d) 657 (1928) (liability to privilege tax as
contractor); Box Elder County v. Conley, 284 Pac. 105 (Utah, 1930) (lia-
bility to tax of auto assembled in California and shipped to Utah in March,
1927); Nash Sales Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 198 Wis. 281, 224 N. W. 126
(1929) (liability to tax).
51 State v. Grove, 109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82 (1921) ("franchise"-
statute forbade employees of corporation holding municipal franchise
to hold office--defendant had been elected but had not taken office);
McGinnis v. Cossar, 230 Ky. 213, 18 S. W. (2d) 988 (1929) ("term"
-whether election to sheriff's office was possible after serving out an un-
expired term in view of statutory prohibition of re-election to such office) ;
Wingate v. Flynn, 139 Misc. 770 (19 1) (length of term-6 or 14 years);
Fox Dist. Att'y v. Ross, 7 D. & C. 263 (Pa. 1926) (term-time at which
office was to be filled by election after an appointment to fill an unexpired
term); Criswell v. Martin, 8 D. & C. 425 (Pa. 1926) (forfeiture of judge's
pension if judge returned to practice).
52 Waits v. Kelley, 118 Kan. 751, 234 Pac. 827 (1925) (allowance for
transporting children to school) ; Nichols v. Board of Ed. of Danville, 232
Ky. 428, 23 S. W. (2d) 607 (1930) (compensation for clerk of county court
for making out defendant's tax bills) ; Hawkins v. Fiscal Court of Caldwell
County, 233 Ky. 211, 25 S. W. (2d) 1015 (1930) ("paid"-offieer's right
to fee when convicted person worked out the fine).
53 In the Matter of the Application of the School District of Stelton, 31
Dau. 75 (Pa. 1927) (statutory limits of deposit) ; City of Bristol v. Bank of
Bristol, 159 Tenn. 647, 21 S. W. (2d) 620 (1929) (power to issue $10,000
or $6,000 in bonds, statute ambiguous).
54 Rice v. Franklin Loan & Finance Co., 82 Colo. 163, 258 Pac. 223
(1927); Marine Lighterage Corp. v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 139 MIsc. 612,
248 N. Y. Supp. 71 (1931); Warren v. Commerce Union Bank, 152 Tenn.
67, 274 S. W. 539 (1925) (right to have branch banks in face of state statute
against them-arose in connection irith contract to buy bank).
Is People v. Smith,-206 N. Y. 231, 99 N. E. 568 (1912); McCabe v.
Voorhis, 243 N. Y. 401, 153 N. E. 849 (1926).56 These do not include the motives for bringing the suit, which may be
the desire for protection, relief, freedom, security, or revenge, and may be
induced by doubts and fears, emanating from the plaintiff or others. See
45 HAnv. L. Ru. 793, 802. With these the court has nothing to do.
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opinion or involving a moot case, and on actions for declaratory
judgments courts have as a rule been alert and astute not to
render advisory opinions, or decide abstract or hypothetical ques-
tions or moot cases7 The elements of justiciability are no dif-
ferent in federal than in state courts and there is no peculiar
charm in the word "case" or "controversy" which implies any
difference." I
In addition to justiciability, however, which is as fundamental
to actions for declarations as it is to those seeking any other form
of judicial relief, courts having power to render declaratory judg-
ments have a wide discretion in declining the declaration where
it will not finally settle the issue, where it will not serve a useful
purpose, or where for any other reason the court thinks it ought
to be withheld. Actions seeking declarations often associate a
prayer for some ancillary form of relief, such as injunction or
specific performance; and where the court grants only one prayer,
it is usually the declaration alone, not the ancillary relief, which
is given. That generally settles the issue conclusively. The
court's discretion is broad enough to enable it to say, in the rare
case in which more experience of the operation of a statute might
be required than is afforded by the case sub judice, that it prefers
not to render a declaratory judgment under the circumstances.
But it is not conceivable that in such a case it would grant any
other form of relief, so that it could probably be said, were the
pending federal declaratory judgment Act passed, that the types
of cases which the court has heretofore refused to decide are the
types in which declaratory judgments will be refused. The as-
sumption that actions for declaratory judgments will come before
the court on a different kind of record than would any other
action seems destitute of substantial foundation. The types of
cases referred to by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Burnet v. Coronado
Oil & Gas Co.,59 which have apparently induced the apprehensions
of the Harvard Law Review, are not well adapted to submission
57 Crawford v. Favour, supra note 25; Hayden Plan Co. v. Wood, 97 Cal.
App. 1, 275 Pac. 248 (1929); City of Mankato v. Jewell County Comm.,
125 Kan. 674, 266 Pac. 96 (1928); Garden City News v. Hurst, supra note
24; Axton v. Goodman, 205 Ky. 382, 265 S. W. 806 (1924); Shearer v.
Backer, 207 Ky. 450, 269 S. W. 543 (1925); Revis v. Dougherty, 215 Ky.
823, 287 S. W. 28 (1926); In re City of Pittsburgh's City Charter, 297
Pa. 502, 147 Atl. 525 (1929) ; Perry v. City of Elizabethton, 160 Tenn. 102,
22 S. W. (2d) 359 (1930). The disposition of the Supreme Court to cite
the Grannis and Willing cases in support of its opposition to advisory opin-
ions, or moot cases, or the review of administrative conclusions (see 31
COL. L. REV. 594) indicates regrettable confusion as to the nature of a de-
claratory judgment.
58 The numerous state cases which have dealt with the question of justici-
ability have given consideration to all the requisites of judicial power estab-
lished by the Supreme Court. See 31 CoL. L. R.v. 561 et seq.
. 59 Supra note 3.
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by declaratory action, and even if theywere so presented, the
court has full discretion to decline a declaration. But this is no
reason for denying to litigants and to the federal courts the
speedy determination of disputed legal issues raised on more or
less undisputed facts, "the declaration of a rule of law," the types
of cases practically universally submitted for declaratory judg-
ment. The fears of "advance determinations" on inadequate "ex-
perience of actual operation" of statutes must vanish before the
established results of actual experience of the declaratory judg-
ment in the United States and foreign countries. Semper plus
metuit animus ignotum malum.
E. M. B.
NIXON v. CONDON-DISFRANCHISEMENT OF THE
NEGRO IN TEXAS
ON May 26, 1927, the Governor of Texas officially informed the
Legislature I that the United States Supreme Court in Nixon v.
Herndon2 had declared unconstitutional a Texas statute 1 pro-
hibiting negroes from voting in Democratic primaries. With the
same message, he submitted for legislative consideration a repeal
.of this article and "the enactment of a statute which will vest
power in the executive committee of the several political parties
to determine the qualifications requisite to membership in such
parties." Within less than a week, this recommendation had
been translated into a bill containing an emergency clause recit-
ing a public necessity, which passed the House of Representa-
tives by a vote of 77 to 26.4 The Senate handled the proposed
enactment with kindred expedition, and within four months of
the Supreme Court's declaration that "it is too clear for extended
argument that color cannot be made the basis of statutory classi-
fication," the executive committee of the Democratic party of
Texas had passed a resolution that "all white Democrats . . .
and none other" be allowed to participate in the forthcoming
primary elections.
An action in tort - against the primary officials was soon begun
by the same negro who had successfully attacked the statute in
Nixon v. Herndon. The District Court dismissed the suit on the
ITEX. H. R. J. 40th Leg. 1st C. S. 207.
2 273 U. S. 536,. 47 Sup. Ct. 446 (1927).
3 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (1925) art. 3107. A Federal District Court in
Chandler v. Neff, 298 Fed. 515 (W. D. Tex. 1924), had refused to grant'
an injunction against enforcement of the statute.
4 TEx. Ir. R. J. 40th Leg. 1st C. S. 301.
5 Nixon v. Condon, 34 F. (2d) 464 (W. D. Tex. 1929). See Notes (1930)
15 CORN. L. Q. 262;' (1930) 43 HARv. L. R. 467; (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 423.
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ground that no violation of the fourteenth or fifteenth amend-
ments was shown, since the plaintiff's exclusion from participa-
tion in the primary was not the result of actioii by'a state
agency.6 The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the
resolution of the party committee, adopted pursuant to statutory
authorization was the act of a state agency. Consequently, it fell
directly within the authority of Nixan v. Herndon and was in-
valid as a denial by the state of the equal protection of the laws.
The move thus rebuffed is the latest of a long series of meas-
ures which Southern political ingenuity has devised in an attempt
to disfranchise the negro race.8 The social upheaval which fol-
lowed the Civil War and reconstruction period witnessed a radi-
cal shift of political power from the landowning aristocracy to
the lower classes of "poor white" tenant farmers, wage earners,
and small-scale business men. This group brought with them a
racial feeling the intensity of which is traceable to the "poor
white's" hatred and jealousy of the negro slave who occupied the
only stratum of society below him and at the same time deprived
him of an economic advantage as menial servant and laborer for
the upper classes of white societyY Fostered by such antipathy
the Ku Klux Klan and other "public safety" organizations man-
aged to maintain the "purity" of the election booth for a decade
by recourse to threats and violence.10 But with the decline of the
militant spirit which had been engendered by the War of the
States, private enforcement became lax.1' Blacks as well as whites
were marching to the polls. Then and then only were legal steps
taken to nullify the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. Edu-
6 The application of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments was early
restricted to actions of agents of the state. United States v. Reese, 92
U. S. 214 (1875); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1875).
7 Nixon v. Condon, 52 Sup. Ct. 484 (U. S. 1932).
8 See generally, LEWINSON, RACE, CLASS, A.N PARTY (1932); Johnson,
A Negro Looks at Politics (1929) 18 AMERICAN AIERCURY 88; Roofter,
Race in Politics (1929) 7 SocrAL FoRC s 435. The early constitutions of
many states restricted the suffrage to whites. The problem of negro suf-
frage was by no means a new one after the Civil War. See REUTER, THE
AmERICAN RACE PROBLEI (1927) 150.
9 SPERo AN HARRis, THE BLAcK WoRKER (1931) 3-15. The "poor white"
class, consisting of almost half the population of the Southern States, were
victims of the slave system. "The poor white envied the slave's security
and hated him for his material advantages, while the slave envied the
white man's freedom and hated him for the advantages of his whiteness.
Each group, in an effort to exalt itself, looked down upon the other with
all the contempt which the planter aristocracy showed to both." See also
Buck, Poor Whites of the ante-bellwn South (1926) 31 Am. HIsT. RIv. 41.
10 LEWINSON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 54-58.
- It seems quite probable that this apathy was caused in part by a
division of the Southern whites during the agricultural depression of the
eighties and nineties. Neither faction was reluctant to seek the negro vote.
See LEWINSON, op. cit. supra note E6 at 68-74.
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cational tests were required for voting,12 poll tax payments were.
prescribed, 8 and the famous Grandfather clause 14 was passed.
These measures were only partly satisfactory. Educational tests
served to disqualify white as well as black illiterates, and were
feared as a sword which the dominant political organization
might use against its opponents. The poll tax was a burden upon
all classes, and besides allowing negroes who could pay the tax
to vote, it operated to exclude whites as well as negroes. And
the Grandfather clause was declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court in a decision:,- which signified that it was willing
to examine the intention as well as the particular wording of a
disfranchising statute.
In Texas, exclusion of negroes from Democratic primaries had
for some time been quietly accomplished by order of the County
executive committees,16 instructing primary officials to allow only
white Democrats to vote.' This disfranchisement of the "newly
captured savage" Is was in part a result of the composite phe-
12 The Constitution of Mississippi in 1898 (art. 12, § 244) required that
"every elector in addition to the foregoing qualifications, shall be able to
read any section of the constitution of this state; or shall be able to under-
stand the same when read to him, or give a reasonable interpretation
thereof." See LovE, THE DISFRANCHISEMENT OF THE NEGRO (1899) 15:
"In Mississippi a negro may be as rich as Dives and as wise as Solomon
and yet he may not be able to satisfy an ignorant and partisan registration
officer that he is qualified to be an elector; while a white man may be as
poor as Lazarus and may not possess the intellectual outfit of a hottentot
and yet he will experience no difficulty in convincing the same individual
that he is qualified to exercise all the rights and privileges of that class
whose 'destiny it is to dominate.'"
23 LEWINSON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 80.
14 Constitution of Louisiana, § 5, provided that no person entitled to vote
before 1867 and no son or grandson of such person should be disqualified by
reason of his failure to possess the educational or property qualifications
prescribed by the constitution. The Grandfather clause was never accorded
complete support from the white ranks: "There are in Alabama as in all
the States, large numbers of Negroes, who perhaps would be unable to
establish legitimacy of birth, but could nevertheless easily establish the
identity of white fathers or grandfathers." Birmingham Age-Herald, Juno
5, 1912, quoted in LEWINSON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 84.
' Guinn and Beal v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, 35 Sup. Ct. 926 (1915).
The election officials who used the Grandfather clause to deprive largo
numbers of negroes of suffrage rights were later tried and convicted of
conspiracy to deprive citizens of constitutional rights. Guinn v. United
States, 228 Fed. 103 (1915).
16 LEWINSON, op. cit. supra note 8, 113.
- This action also was taken pursuant to statutory authority: TEx. REV.
CIv. STAT. (1911) art. 3092. "Provided, that the executive committee of
any party for any county may prescribe additional qualifications for voters
in such primaries, not inconsistent with thii title."
18 The typical attitude is expressed in exceedingly strong language in an
essay on The Buck Negro, 1 WRITINGS OF W. C. BRANN (1898) 24. But see
HOPE, THE NEGRO AND THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE (1905) 51.
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nomenon of racial prejudice which manifested itself in a demand
that party, religious group, and other social institutions be lily-
white. The negro, in theory, could organize his own party,10
church, or social organization, and with that.privilege, it was
argued, he could not reasonably complain of racial discrimina-
tion. To no less extent, however, the movement to disfranchise
the negro is traceable to a conviction in the Texas mind that to
invest the negro with the balance of power, besides opening the
possibility of "black government," would initiate a mad struggle
between the opposing factors of the white Democrats to secure
the negro vote by purchase, barter, and corruption. -0 Strife has
been bitter within the party and examples are not wanting where
the negro vote has actually been used in attempts to obtain
electoral control.21 Thus is presented the strange picture of one
race disfranchising another to save itself from the consequences
of its own vices.
The unity on the negro suffrage question of otherwise opposed
factions of Texas Democrats, therefore, is not difficult of expla-
nation. The representative from the rural sections votes for an
anti-suffrage measure because he is appalled at the spectre of an
election lost as a result of negro votes cast under the influence
of "Wall Street" money in the hands of urban interests. The
representative from the urban centers, on the other hand, casts
his vote for the same legislation because he fears the conse-
quences which will follow if the uninstructed black goes with the
illiterate white to the polls under the influence of soapbox damna-
tion of the "money interests." Neither faction is confident of its
ability to organize an auxiliary negro machine of stability and
permanence. The magnitude of this .task and the fear of reprisal
from the opposing faction have, perhaps as much as any preju-
dice against the negro, brought about a united stand for negro
disfranchisement.
The recent Texas statutes seem to have reduced to fundamental
issues the dramatic tournament which had its inception in the
War of the States. The Texas Legislature passed a statute 22
19 The argument was made by counsel for the state of Texas in Nixon v.
Herndon, supra note 2, that the negro might form his own Democratic party
and thereby receive equal protection of the laws. Dallas News, March 8,
1907, at 1
20 This argument acquires real significance when viewed in the light of
the situation which has developed in South Texas, where a political machine
subsidizes an illiterate Mexican balance of power to enable itself to control
thd political destiny of thirteen Texas counties. See Weeks, The Texas-
Mexican and the Politics of South Texas (1930) 24 Am. POL. Sc. REv. 606.
21 The immediate incident which resulted eventually in the passage of the
first Texas anti-negro-suffrage statute was caused by a petty struggle for
control of negro voters in San Antonio.
22 Tux. REV. CIv. CODE (Vernon, 1928) art. 3107.
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categorically denying negroes the privilege of voting in Demo-
cratic primaries. This act seems to have been drafted under the
assumption that it would be challenged only under the fifteenth
amendment, whigh presumably applied only to that election
which was "the final choice of an officer by the duly qualified
electors." 23 Attempts were made by counsel for both sides to
have the case decided on the issue of whether the primary was an
election within the scope of the fifteenth amendment.2 4 Thus the
question whether the act of primary officials in denying suffrage
was an act of a state agency and so invalid would have been
answered.
Mr. Justice Holmes, however, writing for a unanimous Court
in Nixon v. Herndon refused to pass upon the question of the
applicability of the fifteenth amendment, it being "hard to im-
agine a more direct and obvious infringement of the fourteenth,"
the amendment which, while applicable to all, "was passed . . .
with a special intent to protect the blacks from discrimination
against them."21 The language of the opinion shows no effort
to conceal the lack of sympathy with which Mr. Justice Holmes
regarded the purpose of the act.26 An aside, however, uttered as
he concluded the reading of his opinion, demonstrated his realis-
tic appreciation of the futility of judicial interference: "I know
that our good brethren, the negroes of Texas, will now rejoice
that they possess at the primary the rights which heretofore they
have enjoyed at the general election." 27
Thus arose the occasion for the statute authorizing the execu-
tive committee to determine the qualifications requisite to mem-
bership which, in Nixon v. Condon, met the same fate as its pred-
ecessor. It was recognized by all as a direct attempt to disfran-
chise the negro28 Its only material opposition before enactment
23 The phrase is from United States v. Newberry, 256 U. S. 232, 41 Sup.
Ct. 469 (1921). Discussion in local political circles was based on the
assumption that the statute would be upheld on the basis of this definition.
24 Letter from Hon. Fred C. Knollenberg of plaintiff's counsel (April 21,
1932): "Of course in that case there was a direct violation of the 15th
amendment, and I tried my best in argument to get the Supreme Court to
lay the decision under that amendment... And that leaves us in the dark as
to just what the fifteenth amendment means by the word 'voting.'"
2 5Nixon v. Herndon, supra note 2, at 541.
26 "The statute of Texas in the teeth of the prohibitions referred to as-
sumes to forbid negroes to take part in a primary the importance of which
we have indicated, discriminating against them by the distinction of color
alone. States may do a good deal of classifying that it is difficult to believe
rational, but there are limits, and it is too clear for extended argument
that color cannot be made the basis of a statutory classification affecting
the right set up in this case."
27 The statemernt is quoted on the authority and with the permission of
an auditor who was present at the time the opinion was read.
28 The emergency clause attached to the new statute called attention to
the "public necessity" creited' by the Supreme Court's action in holding
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came from those who feared a possible extension of its applica-
tion beyond the purpose for which it was created.29 The State
Senate attempted to obviate this possibility by adding amend-
ments denying the committee power to bar groups from the pri-
maries because of former political affiliations, or membership or
non-membership in organizations other than the political party.",
Nevertheless the executive committee met before the 1930 pri-
maries and adopted a resolution barring as candidates all who
had violated the party pledge by bolting the party in the 1928
presidential campaign. Thereupon a special act"' was passed by
the Legislature conferring upon the Supreme Court of the State
original jurisdiction to hear mandamus proceedings against
party officials in order to compel "the performance of duties im-
posed upon them by law." 32 Acting thereunder, the Supreme
Court in Love v. Wilcox 3 issued a writ commanding the execu-
tive committee to certify for the primary ballot the name of an
aspirant who had bolted the party in 1928. The Court held that
the contested resolution was expressly forbidden by statute and
so invalid, whether the committee acted as an "agency of the
state" or as "a mere agency of the party." In a later case, 4 the
validity of a resolution requiring a strict party pledge as a con-
dition to voting in the primaries was at issue. The Court upheld
the resolution 35 on the ground, among others, that the statute
was a "grant of power to the State Executive Commitee of a
party to determine who shall participate in the acts of the party."
the previous statute unconstitutional. TFX. LAWS (1927) C. 67, § 2. State
Senator Thomas Love in an interview, stated that "this act had for its
purpose the barring of negroes from Democratic elections, and no other
purpose." Dallas Morning News, May 3, 1932 at 1.
29 A member of the House of Representatives in recording his reasons
for voting against the bill, stated that "in my humble judgment it is far
more dangerous to entrust our whole political destiny to a few men than
the scare of the negro question could ever be." The e.xecutive committee
could "ostracize a man at will and set up a standard to suit itself." TMn.
H. R. J. 40th Leg. 1st C. S. (1927) 302.
30 The Legislature subsequently repealed this amendment in order to al-
low the executive committee to pass resolutions barring from the primaries
all Democrats who had voted the Republican ticket in 1928. The bill was
vetoed by the governor "in the interests of party harmony." See Love v.
Wilcox, 28 S. W. (2d) 515, 524 (Tex. 1930).
-1 Senate Bill No. 16, approved Feb. 14, 1930.
32 An attempt was made in White v. Lubbock, 30 S. W. (2d) 722 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1930), to bring a mandamus action against the party officials in
order to enforce a negro's right to vote in the primary. It was held that
the action would not lie in equity and that there was no illegal discrim-
ination against the negro under the statute.
3 Op. cit. supra note 30.
-Love v. Buelmer, Texas Supreme Court, April 21, 1932.
53 Opponents of the statute have derived amusement from its present
status, wherein the executive committee is allowed to bar whites but not
negroes from the primaries. Dallas News, May 3, 1932 at 1.
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Meanwhile, other Southern states were disfranchising negroes
under similar statutes ° In Virginia, an action was brought
against the primary officials, and both the Federal District
Court 37 and the Circuit Court of Appeals 38 denied the power of
the Democratic executive committee to pass a resolution restrict-
ing participation in the primaries to white voters. The opinion
of the District Court, adopted by the Circuit Court of Appeals,
insisted that a primary should be regarded as a general election;
that under decisions of the Virginia courts,", there was no funda-
mental difference between a primary and an election; and that
the contested resolution of the executive committee was an
"official act." Although the Court did not expressly so conclude,
its reasoning seems clearly to bring the primary within the pur-
view of the fifteenth amendment.4 0 The investment of the party
officials with power to determine the qualifications of primary
voters, and thus presumably to disfranchise the negro, was char-
acterized as an attempt by the Legislature to "do indirectly that
which it had no authority to do directly."
In arriving at a contrary result in Nixon v. Condon, the Fed-
eral Courts in Texas distinguished the Virginia case on the
ground that primaries in Virginia were conducted at public ex-
pense, and that since the primary officials drew compensation
from the state, they were officials of the state.41 On the other
hand, the District Court maintained, a political party in Texas
is a "voluntary organization," and the statute granting it power
to prescribe qualifications requisite to membership was not
needed to confer such power; "it merely recognized a power that
already existed." 42
36 See, for example,. ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) § 612; FLA. Coip. LAWS
(1927) § 377. In South Carolina, by party rule, a negro is allowed to vote
in the primaries if "the affidavits of ten white men are produced showing
that applicant voted for Wade Hampton for governor in 1876, and for
Democratic candidates ever since." LEWINSON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 236.
37 West v. Bliley, 33 F. (2d) 177 (E. D. Va. 1929).
38 Bliley v. West, 42 F. (2d) 101 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930). See Notes (1929)
33 LAw NoTES 101; (1930) 16 VA. L. Rv. 193.
39 Commonwealth v. Willcox, 111 Va. 849, 69 S. E. 1027 (1911).
40 "The General Assembly of Virginia having provided the primary as a
method (though optional) for the nomination of candidates, and the Su-
preme Court of Virginia having declared it when adopted an inseparable
part of the election machinery, it would seem to me necessarily to follow
that the Legislature cannot be delegation or otherwise give vitality to a
claimed right which it is itself prohibited by the Constitution from enacting
into law."
41 The Virginia Courts paid only passing attention to this distinction.
42 An early recognition of this attitude caused criticism of the Legislature
for risking Supreme Court action in passing a new statute: "It is an
anomaly for the state to grant power which it does not possess to a political
party that already possesses such power." Dallas News, March 9, 1927t at 1.
The Governor in submitting the recommendation to the Legislature that
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Mr. Justice Cardozo in writing for the majority of the Su-
preme Court in Nixon v. Condon refused either to affirm or deny
"whether a political party in Texas has inherent power today
to determine its own membership." He placed the decision upon
the narrow ground that the executive committee had acted under
the authority of a state statute in adopting the contested resolu-
tion and had therefore functioned as a state agency. It was argued
that since the executive committee exercises only delegated
powers,4 3 and since no authority to prescribe qualifications for
primary voters was ever delegated by the party convention, the
committee acted under the authority of the statute as "delegates
of the state" in excluding negroes.
Mr. Justice McReynolds, dissenting," discussed as the deter-
minative issue whether the Texas primary was to be treated as
a general election and therefore as a state function. His conclu-
sion that there is a fundamental difference between the two,
while directly in line with the authority of Texas decisions,15
nevertheless fails to take account of the realities of Texas poli-
tics.6 Contests for public office are won or lost in the Democratic
primary, the general election serving only to endorse the Demo-
cratic candidate there selected. To be more than a gesture,
therefore, the privilege to vote must be extended to primary par-
ticipation.
Conventionally, the primary has been considered in the same
category as the party caucus which it succeeded: a private or-
ganization subject to state regulation only when subjected to
specific legislation. Thus the courts have frequently held that
laws punishing fraud,4 7 bribery,48 and wagering in elections
did not apply to offenses committed in primaries. Similarly in
Texas, a statute conferring voting privileges upon women in pri-
mary: elections was upheld on the ground that a constitutional
clause limiting suffrage to male citizens did not apply to pri-
maries.50
In United States v. Newberry,5' the Supreme Court was con-
the statute be passed, acted on the advice of "one of the leading and best
lawyers of this state." Letter of His Excellency, Dan Bloody.
432 BRYcE, MODERN DEMOCRACIES 40.
44 Justices Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter concurred in the dissent.
45 Koy v. Schneider, 110 Tex. 369, 218 S. W. 479 (1920); Waples v.
Alarrast, 108 Tex. 5, 184 S. W. 180 (1916).
46 Thus in 1926, a total of 821,234 votes were cast in the first Democratic
primary; 766,318 votes were polled in the second primary; while in the
general election, 265,507 votes were cast. Of this number, the Republican
party polled 31,531. TExAs ALmANAC (1928) 167.
47 State v. Woodruff, 68 N. J. L. 89, 52 Atl. 294 (1902).
48 People v. Cavanaugh, 112 Cal. 674, 44 Pac. 1057 (1896).
49 Commonwealth v. Wells, 110 Pa. 463, 1 Atl. 310 (1885).
50 Koy v. Schneider, supra note 45.
51 Supra note 23.
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fronted with the question of the status of primary elections. An
indictment had been brought against Newberry for violation of
the Corrupt Practices Act 52 in securing his nomination for the
United States Senate in a primary election. The Court was
unanimous only in its decision that the case should be reversed.
Four justices, Mr. Justice McReynolds writing the opinion,
agreed that the constitution granted no power to Congress to
legislate with reference to any political contest other than one
involving "the final choice" of the electorate.13 Primaries, accord-
ing to Mr. Justice McReynolds, are "in no sense elections for an
office, but merely methods by which party adherents agree upon
candidates whom they intend to offer and support for ultimate
choice by all qualified electors." 54
In his dissenting opinion in Nixon v. Condon, Mr. Justice
McReynolds did not discuss the question of the status of primary
elections except in relation to the Texas situation. He cited only
Texas cases, and in refusing to draw upon the authority of
United Sh~tes v. Newberry, left open the inference that the ques-
tions presented in the two cases were distinct. By so employing
his arguments, Mr. Justice McReynolds seemingly was attempt-
ing to save his opinion in the Newberry case from being placed
finally in the category of a lost cause. With this angle of the
case completely ignored by the majority opinion, he might well
have proceeded as if his argument on the point were conceded
and have confined his dissent to the simple question of the state
agency of primary officials while acting under authority of the
state statute. This was the issue of the case selected as deter-
minative by the majority opinion, and by discussing the ques-
tion of the difference between primary and election in his dissent,
the Justice has apparently used poor strategy.
The course now open to the leaders of the anti-negro-suffrage
forces is clear. They may well conclude from the language of
Mr. Justice Cardozo that their purpose may be attained by re-
pealing the ineffective statute and procuring the Democratic con-
vention to delegate to the executive committee power to deter-
mine the qualifications of participants in primaries. This will
52 36 STAT. 822-824, as amended by 37 STAT. 25-29.
t3 In United States v. Gradwell, 243 U. S. 476, 37 Sup. Ct. 407 (1916), the
question of the similarity of primaries and elections was before the Court.
An indictment was found against several defendants for procuring ineligible
persons to vote in a primayy. Without deciding whether Congress had
power to control primary elections, the Court held that the statute under
which the indictment was brought did not apply.
- Only four Justices agreed to this statement of the decision. Mr. Justice
McKenna concurred in the opinion as applied to the particular statute, but
reserved opinion on the question of ,the power of Congress. Chief Justice
White and Justices Brandeis, Pitney, and Claike were in agreement that the
case should be reversed, but differed as to the particular error committed.
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likely be the next move, and it is a fair guess that the Supreme
Court will not hold the convention and executive committee to be
state agencies. There will then be no reasonable basis for hold-
ing that they are possessed of authority "originating or sup-
posed to originate in the mandate of the law." Nor does it seem
probable that the situation would be far different if the statute
were repealed and the executive committee then prescribed the
qualifications without delegation of authority from either the con-
vention or the state. The possibility, however, that any state
control over primaries may be used as a ground for classifying
them as state agencies may provoke a more drastic move: repeal
of all state laws pertaining to primary elections. This seems to
be under consideration at the present time in Texas,-5 where
Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion has been construed as intimating
that regulation of the primary by the state has made parties and
their representatives- "the custodians of official power...
agencies of the state, the instruments by which government be-
comes a living thing." 16
THEORIES OF ENFORCEMENT OF COLLECTIVE LABOR
AGREEMENTS
COLLECTIVE agreements: between unions and employers vary
from simple schedules of wages or hours to elaborate documents
requiring a closed shop and regulating such subjects as arbitra-
tion of disputes, rights of seniority, hire of apprentices, shop
conditions, and use of safety appliances and labor saving devices.2
The union frequently confers upon the employer the privilege
of using its label, stamp, or shop card; 3 it may expressly engage
to refrain from ordering a strike or boycott; 4 and occasionally
the union goes so far as to undertake to enforce the agreement
on its members by fines and penalties.2 Essentially the collective
55 N. Y. Times, May 8, 1932, at 6.
56 It is not impossible that the verdict of the Supreme Court will be ac-
cepted as final in Texas. The Committee on Resolutions of the Democratic
State Convention passed a resolution on May 24, 1932 to the effect that the
State Convention would take no action to bar negroes from the primaries.
However, this may mean nothing more than that the Resolutions Committee
deems it politic to attempt disfranchisement by repeal of the statute and
action of the executive committee.
IFor a bibliography on this subject see COMMONS AND ANDREws, PaIN-
CIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION (1927) 552.
2Schaffner, The Labor Contract fromn Individual to Collective Bargaining
(1907) BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN No. 182 (Collective
Agreements in Appendix at 136-182).
s THE COMIIDIONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, BUREAU OF STATISTICS (1917)
Collective Agreemeits between Employers and Labor Organizations 128-
26. See also statistics, at 207-233.
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agreement is a statement of the conditions under which a con-
tinuing service is to be performed, rather than a contract of
employment.° However, when the employer promises to hire, and
the union, to supply union men 7 or the court implies such a
promise on the part of the union,8 a close approximation of a
contract of employment is attained.
Collective bargaining, the central activity of trade unions," is
vital to liberty of contract, as only in combination can the em-
ployees approximate the employer's bargaining power.1Y The
agreements into which this bargaining crystallizes must be ade-
quately enforced by the courts not only to give effect to the in-
tent of the parties and insure fair dealing between them, but
also to avoid the inevitable alternative to judicial sanction, strikes
and lockouts, costly alike to employer, employee, and consumer.11
The employee, for his individual protection, must be given re-
course against the employer for any damages directly occasioned
by the employer's breach of the agreement.12 Theoretically the
employer should be given a reciprocal right against the employee.
However, this will be of little practical value since collection of
damages is seldom feasible,13 and specific performance or an
injunction against breach is not available. 4 It is therefore essen-
tial that the employer be given a right against the union, to
compel both its conformity to the agreement and its use of
4 Such provisions are frequently included in the collective agreements
referred to, supra. notes 2 and 3.
5 For an interesting discussion of this aspect see BLOCH, LABoR Aa iu-
MENTS IN COAL MINES (1931) 291-322.
G Hamilton, Collective Bargaining (1930) ENCYC. SOC. SCIENCES, 628.
7 Goldman v. Cohen, 222 App. Div. 631, 227 N. Y. Supp. 311 (1st Dep't
1928).18 Maisel v. Sigman, 123 Misc. 714, 205 N. Y. Supp. 807 (1924); Nedor-
landsch Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Maatschappij v. Stevedores & Long-
shoremen's Benevolent Society, 265 Fed. 397 (D. La. 1920).
9 See Hamilton, Collective Bargaining, supra note 6.
2o See language of Justice Holmes, dissenting in Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U. S. 1, 27, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 248 (1915). For the nature of the right to
organize, see Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S.
Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 50 Sup. Ct. 427 (1930) ; see COMIONS AND ANDREWS,
op. cit. .supra note 1, at 125.
1 For judicial recognition of this necessity see Weber v. Nasser, 286 Pac.
1074, 1076 (Cal. App. 1930), appeal dismissed, 210 Cal. 607, 292 Pac. 637
(1930); Schlesinger v. Quinto, 201 App. Div. 487, 500, 194 N. Y. Supp.
401, 411 (1st Dep't 1922).
L2For the measure of damages occasioned by such breach, see Gary v.
Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 37. Ga. App. 744, 141 S. E. 819 (1928). For
state legislation aimed at the protection of the employee, see Legis. (1931)
44 HARv. L. REV. 1287.
13 See Shaffner, op. cit. supra note 2, at 22 (laborer seldom has property
in excess of statutory exemption).
'4 Stevens, Involuntary Servitude by Injunction (1920) 6 CORN. L .Q. 235.
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discipline to reach any employee who is a union member.15 Con-
versely, the union must be enabled to enforce the agreement
against the employer since it alone has power to invoke the one
means of effective enforcement, an injunction against continued
breach.16 Moreover, should the employer commit such a breach
as hiring non-union men or refusing to dismiss men expelled
from the union, the employee could show no money damages and
his relief would depend entirely upon the union's ability to en-
force the agreement.
Unfortunately, however, in the development of the law of
collective agreements the courts have adopted rules whose utility
is limited to the particular type of situation for which they were
invoked. 17 The most important of these rules historically, is based
on the theory that the agreement creates a usage which becomes
a part of any existing or subsequent employment contract be-
tween the employer and an employee in the absence of a delib-
erately conflicting contract between them.18 Although this theory
provides a realistic interpretation of the nature and effect of col-
lective agreements as between employer and employee, 9 its
application has been strictly limited by the courts. . ° It is seri-
ously defective, moreover, in failing to create any obligations
:15 (1930) 30 COL. L. Rnv. 410. The employer may be deprived of this right
(David Adler & Sons Co. v. Maglio, 200 Wis. 153, 228 N. W. 123 (1929))
or even of his protection under the agreement (Engelking v. Independent
Wet Wash Co., 142 Misc. 510, 254 N. Y. Supp. 87 (1931)) if he violates
it first.
16 (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 1158; see Mason, Organized Labor as Party
Plaintiff in'Injunction Cases (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 466.
7 Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law (1931) 44 MARv.
L. Rnv. 572 (comprehensive discussion of the existing rules and their de-
ficiencies).
is See Hudson v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & F. P. Ry. Co., 152 Ky. 711, 154 S .W.
47 (1913) (a leading case though not a holding on the point); Hall v. St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 224 Mo. App. 431, 28 S. W. (2d) 687 (1930);
Moody v. Model Window Glass Co., 145 ArL 197, 224 S. W. 436 (1920).
19 Note (1924) 24 COL. L. REv. 409.
-The usage theory has been so stated as to preclude recovery by an
employee who did not know of the agreement. Cross Mountain Coal Co. v.
Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 468, 9 S. W. (2d) 692, 694 (1928). The farthest that
any court has gone in this direction is to allow recovery when the employee
knew of the agreement but not of the specific term at issue. Mastell v. Salo,
140 Ark. 408, 215 S. W. 583 (1919). No case was found in which an em-
ployee not a member of the union was allowed recovery of damages from
his employer under the usage theory. But see Gregg v. Starks, 188 Ky.
834, 224 S. W. 459 (1920) (non-union employee enjoins union employees and
employer from depriving him of his seniority rights) and United States
Daily Publishing Corp v. Nichols, 32 F. (2d) 834 (App. D. C. 1929) (em-
ployer bound though not a member of the Association making the agree-
ment). In two cases express ratification by the employee was required.
Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co., 180 Mo. 241, 79 S. W. 136 (1904); West v.
Baltimore and Ohio Rr. Co., 103 W. Va. 417, 137 S. E. 654 (1927).
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between the employer and the union.21 More recently the theory
has been advanced that the agreement between the employer and
the union is a valid contract.22 While the major deficiency of the
usage theory is thereby remedied, since the employer and the
union are given mutual rights against each other, no provision
is made for the status of the individual employee except as it is
determined in his separate contract of employment.21 Several
courts have apparently attempted to overcome this disadvantage
by permitting the employee to recover from the employer as a
third party beneficiary of the agreement.24 The apparent willing-
ness with which the courts have allowed recovery on this basis
to an employee who had no knowledge of the agreement,21 or was
not a member of the union,26 is in marked contrast to their re-
luctance to grant such relief on the equally adequate usage
theory.27 This may be due to the courts' desire to avoid making
the usage theory conversely available for the imposition of the
obligations of the collective agreement on such employees. This
result is obtained by use of the third party beneficiary theory
under which no obligation is imposed on the party benefited.
However, this theory is hardly satisfactory, since it fails to give
the employer a remedy against the individual employee. More-
over, if the agreement is between the employee's union and an
employer's association, the employee has no remedy against his
employer unless it can be said that the employer's association in
entering into the collective agreement acted as agent of the indi-
vidual employer28 And it is'difficult logically to apply third party
beneficiary principles to the situation existing under, collective
agreements since the effect of the union's bargain is to establish
a status of employment conditions under which both the employer
and the employee are obligated to perform certain duties; whereas
in the third party beneficiary cases the promisee contemplates
performance by the promissor alone. A somewhat unconventional
theo'y advanced by one court treats the union as the employee's
agent, and the agreement as his individual contract of employ-
21 See Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law (1925) 16
ST. LoUIs L. REV. 1, 3-7.
2 Ribner v. Rasco Butter and Egg Co., 135 Misc. 616, 238 N. Y. Supp.
132 (1929); Weber v. Nasser, supra note 11; Gilchrist v. Metal Polishors
Union, 113 Atl. 320 (N. J. Ch. 1919).
23 As suggested below, however, it is possible to remedy this deficiency
by employing some other theory along with the usage theory.
24 Blum & Co. v. Landau. 23 Ohio App. 426, 155 N. E. 154 (1926); John-
son v. American Railway Express Co., 163 S. C. 191, 161 S. E, 473 (1931).
25 Gulla v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149 N. Y. Supp. 952 (3d Dop't
1914) (both unions incorporated).
2GYazoo & M. V. Rr. Co. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931).
27 Supra note 20.
28 This is apparently the basis of Blum & Co. v. Landau, supra note 24.
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ment.2 9 This rationale is open to the criticism that such agency
does not exist in fact when the employee is not a member of the
union, and is difficult to discover where the employee became a
member of the union after the inception of the agreement. 3
Furthermore, the contract between the union as the employee's
agent and the employer has been said to be illusory since the
union's principal, the employee, need not accept the employment
at all; and if he does, he may, at his option, make a different
contract.31
- It is suggested that the most effective legal formula capable of
contemporary use in the enforcement of collective agreements
would be treatment of the agreement as a valid contract between
the employer and the union, creating a usage which becomes a
part of all existing and subsequent individual employment con-
tracts, unless either the employer or the employee, with actual
knowledge of the agreement, voluntarily waives its benefits.2-
Even though the agreement is quite different from an ordinary
bilateral contract,33 it may nevertheless be considered as one in
order to rationalize its enforcement. 4 Consideration for the em-
ployer's promise, when not specifically mentioned in the agree-
ment, may be found in the implied promise of the union to refrain
from interfering with the employer's conduct of the business.-
A promise not to interfere is undoubtedly a legal detriment as
the right of a union to call a peaceful strike for a "lawful" pur-
pose not in violation of any covenant is now universally recog-
nized.3 6 Adequate means of enforcement of the agreement against
29 Barnes & Co. v. Berry, 156 Fed. 72 (C. C. Ohio 1907). For the simi-
larity between this case and the French system, see infra note 32.
31 For the tendency of the agency rule to make the terms of employment
rigid, see Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S. W. 1042
(1923) and Ahlquist v. Alaska Portland Packers Ass'n, 39 F. (2d) 348
(C. C. A. 9th, 1930).
31 Rice, op. cit. supra note 17, at 594.
32 The system in force in France, developed under similar principles of
law, treats the agreement as a contract between employer (or employer's
association) and union to which individual employees are made parties
through representation. By statute any conflict between the individual con-
tract and the agreement is resolved in favor of the latter. See Fuchs, The
French, Law of Collective Labor Agreenments (1932) 41 YAL L. J. 1005.
For an able discussion of the much more comprehensive and thorough sys-
tem of regulation in Germany, see Fuchs, Collcctie Labor Agreement- in
German Law (1929) 15 ST. Louis L. REv. 1.
33fDuguit, Collective Acts as Distinguished from Contracts (1918) 27
YALE L. J. 753 (a philosophical analysis).
34 Note (1930) 16 CoRN. L. Q. 96.
Harper v. Local Union No. 52, digest of case in U. S. Daily, May 14,
1932, at 498 (Tex. Civ. App.); Note (1931) 19 CALIF. L. RE;. 183.
3 For protection given the union, in a justifiable though violent strike,
against unwarranted interference, see Carpenters' Union v. Citizens Com-
mittee, 333 Ill. 225, 164 N. E. 393 (1928). For a discussion of the right
to strike, see Sayre, Labor and the Courts (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 682, 696
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the union are available to the employer in the form of an injunc-
tion against continued breach by the union,37 since the reasons
for denying such enforcement against an employee, the unwill-
ingness of a court to force a man to hire himself to another, and
the fact that the employer can hire someone else, do not extend
to protect the union.3 1 Enforcement of the agreement between
the employer and the employee is attained by incorporating the
agreement into the individual contract of employment. This can
be justified on the ground that the agreement is sufficiently well
known to warrant an implication of knowledge and therefore Qf
adoption of its terms by both employer and employee. 0 Under
this doctrine, as under the third party beneficiary theory, the
terms of the union's agreement should apply to non-union labor-
ers when, and only when, such i the apparent intention of the
parties to the agreement.40 The requirement of a voluntary
waiver accompanied by actual knowledge of the agreement would
prevent an employer from disregarding its terms, when hiring
an individual employee, and thus limiting its application to the
detriment of both the employee and the union.41 It would also
enable the employer to hire on different terms if the employee
consented.42 Flexibility of the terms of employment is thus not
impaired. Furthermore, opportunity for the union or the em-
ployer to initiate a change is supplied both by the short term for
which most labor agreements are negotiated and by the common
provision for withdrawal on thirty or sixty days' notice .4 A pre-
sumption of acceptance by employees of any alteration could be
implied from silence after adequate notice, which may consist of
conspicuous posting of the new rules.
(general analysis of the legality of Weapons used by labor and employer
in and out of court).
s7 Burgess v. Georgia, F. & A. Ry. Co., 148 Ga. 415, 96 S. . 864 (1918).
For the question of whether a union can sue and be sued, see FnANEM'UTnITt
ANDGREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1929) 82-89 (tabulations of frdoral
and many state labor injunction in appendices); Dodd, Dogma and Practice
in the Law of Associations (1929) 43 HARv L. REV. 977; Sturges, Unincor-
porated Associations as Parties to Actions (1924) 33 YALE L. REV. 383.
38 See Schlesinger v. Quinto, supra note 11, at 499, 194 N. Y. Supp. at
410; (1931) 15 MINN L. REv. 251. But see Chambers v. Davis, 128 MIss.
613, 91 So. 346 (1922) where the court treats a seniority provision as un-
enforceable because somehow contaminated by personal service.
39 Such is the usage rule as stated in Hudson v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & F. P.
Ry. Co., supra note 18, at 717, 154 S. W. at 50.
40 If their intent is otherwise is should be effectuated so as to protect
the union from non-union "chiselers." That this is the law in France, see
Fuchs, op. cit. supra note 32, at 1035.
42 Cf. the situation in Gulla v. Barton, supra note 25.
42As in Langmade v. Olean Brewing Co., 137 App. Div. 355, 121 N. Y.
Supp. 388 (4th Dep't 1910).
43 See THE COMMONWEALTH OF MAsSACHUSETTS, B31UREAU OF STATISTICS,
cit. supra note 3; Bloch, op. cit. supra note 5, at 85; United States Daily
Publishing Corp. v. Nichols, supra note 20.
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PROTECTION OF LOCAL BUSLNESS AGAINST
MOTOR VEHICLE COMPETITION
IN the effort to protect local markets against competitors whose
invasion is made possible by the use of motor transport, attempts
by legislation to erect trade barriers at state frontiers are con-
fronted with overwhelming constitutional obstacles. Thus a stat-
ute imposing a license tax upon each truck used by dealers not
maintaining a permanent place of business within the state, and
excepting from its provisions those selling state-grown produce,
has recently been declared invalid.' The decision would seem to
be a foregone conclusion in view of the long line of decisions by
which both tax and regulatory statutes 2 have been disapproved
on the ground of a "burden" on interstate commerce. It has
not been necessary for this result that the statutes should
be actually discriminatory: they have been condemned even
when the apparent effect was to place businesses operating across
state lines in a position superior to that of those confined within
the state.3 An apparent deviation, explained by the use made of
state-maintained highways, is found in the cases sustaining
license fees on motor vehicles operating in interstate commerce
so long as they do not discriminate between resident and non-
resident.4
1 Gramling v. Maxwell, 52 F. (2d) 256 (D. N. C. 1931). The court did
not find it necessary to consider the effect of the limitation to dealers main-
taining a place of business within the state, the illegality of the discrimina-
tion against foreign produce being well established under previous decisions.
2Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, 6 Sup. Ct. 454 (1896); Robbins v.
Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 7 Sup. Ct. 592 (1887); Brennan v.
Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 14 Sup. Ct. 829 (1894); Caldwell v. North Caro-
lina, 187 U. S. 622, 23 Sup. Ct. 229 (1903); Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. City
of Portland, 268 U. S. 325, 45 Sup. Ct. 525 (1925). The Fourteenth Amend-
ment may be relied upon to invalidate a statute which provides a discrimina-
tory license fee against non-residents. State v. Wiggin, 64 N. H. 508, 15 Atl.
128 (1888). See also Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 10 Sup. Ct. 862
(1890). The statute required inspection of live animals by state inspectors
within 24 hours before slaughter, and it appears from the opinion that the
unreasonableness of the requirement as well as the mere burden on com-
merce was a reason for holding it invalid. The eases reveal the difficulty of
classifying licensing ordinances as revenue measures or as exercises of the
police power. See Brennan v. Titusville, supra at 302, 14 Sup. Ct. at 832
(some police power regulations affecting interstate commerce may be valid,
but none that burden it) ; Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. City of Portland, supra
note 2, at 336, 45 Sup. Ct. at 526.
3 See Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, sulpra note 2, at 499, 501-2, 7
Sup. Ct. at 597, 598; Caldwell v. North Carolina, supra note 2, at 629, 23
Sup. Ct. at 232.
4 Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 35 Sup. Ct. 140 (1915) ; Clark V.
Poor, 274 U. S. 554, 47 Sup. Ct. 702 (1927). Similarly, in the absence of
federal regulation, state regulations as to safety and convenience are valid.
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 (1927); Morris v. Duby,
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Within each state, however, a different situation exists. In
state constitutions, although there are numerous prototypes of
the Fourteenth Amendment,5 no commerce clauses may be found.,
Yet the most dangerous rival of the small local merchant is com-
monly not a business operating on an interstate scale, but one
located within the state and reaching its customers through its
own system of motor deliveries. Ordinances attempting to bring
such competitors within the scope of the regulatory powers of
the municipality by defining peddlers and transient vendors in
such a way- as to exclude residents and persons having an estab-
lished place of business within the city have been held invalid.'
The more effective weapon against the non-resident is the muni-
cipality's power, when so authorized by the state, to license busi-
nesses and occupations for revenue purposes. Disparity in license
fees imposed upon persons engaged in the same business accord-
ing to whether they are resident or non-resident is clearly illegal.8
274 U. S. 135, 47 Sup. Ct. 548 .(1927) (limitation of maximum load to
16,000 lbs. is valid, even though complainants cannot operate profitably sub-
ject to such restriction). But certificates of convenience and public necessity
may not be required of such carriers. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307, 45
Sup. Ct. 324 (1925) ; at least it may not be made to depend upon discretion.
See Clark v. Poor, supra at 556, 47 Sup. Ct. at 702. On the distinctions be-
tween contract and common carriers, and the power of the state to regulato
the former, see Michigan Public Utilities v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 45 Sup. Ct.
191 (1925); Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 005
(1926); Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 469.
5 See INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1915) 971-973.
6 Although there are numerous articles directed against monopolies and
conspiracies in.restraint of trade. INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
1004-1007. An ordinance discriminating against non-residents delivering
products has been held invalid under Art. 2 § 32 of the Oklahoma Constitu-
tion. Grantham v. City of Chickasha, 9 Pac. (2d) 747 (Okla. 1932).
7 Town of Pacific Junction v. Dyer, 64 Iowa 38, 19 N. W. 862 (1884);
Saginaw v. Saginaw, 106 Mich. 32, 63 N. WV. 985 (1895); Ideal Tea Co.
v. Salem, 77 Ore. 182, 150 Pac. 852 (1915); Grantham v. City of Chickasha,
supra note 6. It has sometimes been stated that regulations of peddlers and
transient vendors soliciting orders at dwellings are not only to protect resi-
dents from solicitation by irresponsible individuals but to protect local
merchants from the competition of dealers who have contributed nothing to
the property of the city. See Graffty v. Rushville, 107 Ind. 502, 506, 8 N. E.
609, 611 (1886). This view is disapproved, although it is recognized that
protection of local merchants is often the motive for such ordinances. See
State v. Osborne, 171 Iowa 678, 694, 154 N. W. 294, 298 (1915); North
Carolina v. Williams, 158 N. C. 610, 616, 73 S. E. 1000, 1002 (1912).
8 Muhlenbrinck v. Long Branch, 42 N. J. L. 364 (1880); Eales v. City of
Barbourville, 177 Ky. 216, 197 S. W. 634 (1917); Ex part Irish, 122 Kan.
33, 250 Pac. 1056 (1926). The hu~ting license cases on discriminating be-
tween citizens on the basis of residence in particular counties are analogous.
Harper v. Galloway, 58 Fla. 255, 51 So. 226 (1910); Lewis v. State, 110
Ark. 204, 161 S. W. 154 (1913); State v. Barkley, 192 N. C. 184, 134 S. E.
454 (1926). Cf. State v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367 (1915) (requiring
$3 license fee of non-residents, as against $1 for residents of county, not
so arbitrary as to invalidate statute).
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A more difficult problem is raised when a business involving the
sale and delivery of goods conducted from an establishment out-
side the city is taxed at a higher rate than one conducted from
a permanent place of business within it. Some courts have re-
jected all arguments of "reasonable classification" here and
looked to the plain fact that the non-resident pays more than
the resident.9
In Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickefl10 the Supreme Court
held that to justify separate classification for tax purposes there
need not be a difference in the actual nature of the business but
that a difference in the mode of conducting the business is
sufficient. Under this rule it would be permissible to tax at one
rate dealers not making deliveries and at another those in the
same line of business who do deliver, basing the tax on the num-
ber of trucks or wagons used." Recently, the Circuit Court of
Appeals in Campbell Baking Co. v. City of HarrisonvilleI in-
voked the same rule to uphold a tax on persons selling or deliver-
ing goods under an ordinance which excepted persons having a
fixed place of business in the city.' 3 In so doing the court seems
clearly to have exceeded the authority of the Singer case, because
that involved the distinction between agents selling directly from
the wagon and those operating from a fixed establishment,
whereas the only distinction in the Campbell case is the location
of the plant.' The same dubious result is reached in Hoffnan
Candy Co. v. Newport Beach - by the California court, although
the rule concerning the mode of doing business is repudiated.G
9 Petersen Baking Co. v. Fremont, 119 Neb. 212, 228 N. W. 256 (1929)
(an additional element in this case is that the fee was so large as to be
deemed confiscatory); Hair v. City of Humboldt, 133 Kan. 67, 299 Pac.
268 (1931).
10 233 U. S. 304, 34 Sup. Ct. 493 (1914).
"Such a tax has been upheld but on the ground that it represented a
proper graduation of the tax on persons in the same line of business, meas-
uring the tax by the number of vehicles used. Bramman v. City of Alameda,
162 Cal. 648, 124 Pac. 243 (1912). The fact that trucks and wagons add
to the cost of upkeep of streets would seem to be the soundest basis for
such classification for tax purposes. Cf Bellingrath v. Town of Georgiana,
23 Ala. App. 111, 121 So. 458 (1929) (tax on merchants' deliveries by truck
discriminatory and invalid).
32 50 F. (2d) 670 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931).
13 This is the construction put upon the ordinance by the court. The actual
-wording of the ordinance excepts "any person selling at their regular estab-
lished place of business." Quaere whether bakers are not equally selling
at their regular place of business regardless of whether that is located
-within or without the city.
14See dissenting opinion, supra note 12, at 680.
15 8 Pac. (2d) 235 (1932). Cf. Town of St. Helena v. Butterworth, 198
Cal. 230, 244 Pac. 357 (1926); In re Hines, 33 Cal. App. 45, 164 P. 339
(1917).
16 The "mode of doing business" distinction had been previously rejected.
Ex parte Richardson, 170 Cal. 68, 148 Pac. 213 (1915).
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The ordinance at issue imposed a small license fee on stores
within the city and a $10 license fee per truck on those not fall-
ing within the definition but carrying on the business of trans-
porting goods by truck within the city. An outside candy manu-
facturer challenged the tax as discriminatory because local estab-
lishments could make deliveries without paying a vehicle tax.
The court was persuaded that the business taxed, and the only
business conducted by the candy company within the city, was
that of delivering goods by truck. Obviously, to permit munici-
palities to separate for purposes of definition that portion of an
outside dealer's business which is conducted within its own limits
is to open the door to a complete system of discriminatory fees.
In the Campbell case, to bring a bakery within the statutory
term "merchant," 1 the court stresses the legal argument that
title to the goods does not pass until delivery and that therefore
the company is selling pies and cakes, as well as operating trucks,
within the city. In the Hoffman case, on similar facts, the court
rubs out the sales aspect altogether in order to analogize a candy
company to the transfer or express business. This inconsistency
of treatment suggests that in both cases the courts, in laboring
with refinements of doctrine, are dimming the simple and funda-
mental issue between the need of reasonable freedom in classify-
ing for revenue purposes and of freedom of trade between
citizens of different communities.
Three recent federal cases dealing with statutes enacted by
the 1931 Texas legislature illustrate in novel terms the means by
which localized business may avail itself of the regulatory powers
of state government as a protection against motor vehicle compe-
tition. The protagonists in this drama, as revealed by the opinion
in the first case, McLeaish v. Binford,18 are on the one side per-
sons engaged in hauling cotton, uncompressed, direct to the mar-
ket-port of Houston and, on the other, persons operating cotton
compresses in the interior of the state from which shipment is
made to the ports by rail.i0 The controversy is confined to trans-
actions within the state. The statute at issue,-, which had been
fostered at every stage of its legislative history by a lobby of the
1 As to limitations upon the definition of "merchant" compare Campbell
Baking Co. v. City of Harrisonville, supra note 11, at 675, 676-679 with
Grantham v. City of Chickasha, supra note 6, at 750, 751.
1852 F. (2d) 151 (S. D. Texas 1931, decided Aug. 6), aff'd, 52 Sup. Ct.
207 (1932).
19 The railroads play a subordinate r6le, not appearing in the actual liti-
gation. The traffic manager of the Texas and New Orleans Railroad made
affidavit as to the increase of the cotton movement on trucks from 414,000
lbs. in 1928-29 to 1,180,000 in 1930-31 and predicted the practical monopoli-
zation of the port highways during the months August-October. See foot-
note to opinion, at 153.
20 TEXAS GENERAL LAWs 1931, c. 121, §§ 3 and 4.
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Interior (cotton) Compresses and passed as an emergency meas-
ure under suspension of the rules, undertook to regulate the
trucking of cotton and provided that loads of more than ten bales
should not be hauled unless compressed, nor, even though com-
pressed, except in vehicles completely enclosed. The preamble
recited at length, and the court found that there existed, problems
incidental to cotton trucking which made it a proper subject for
regulatory classification. However, weighing the reasonableness
of the act by its effect upon the business of the complainant
truckers, the court found it restrictive to the point of prohibition
and enjoined its enforcement. 2 1 A second statute dealt with in
Sproles v. Binford, 2 provided for the general regulation of ve-
hicles using the highways and was upheld, except for one sec-
tion, against the complaints of truckers and others whose busi-
ness was affected by the prospect of early enforcement. The
section disapproved limited to a total weight of 7000 lbs. loads
of commodities transported in containers weighing more than
500 lbs. although loads of a different character were permitted
up to 24,000 lbs.23 The discriminatory nature of this provision
is revealed in the fact that bales of cotton weigh more than 500
lbs. on an average. The legislative history of this measure is not
reported but the court granted a temporary injunction in favor
of cotton truckers who complained that the section was arbitrary
and discriminatory as to them.
The third statute,2- at issue in Stepheson v. Biuford,2 treads
in a larger domain, setting up a comprehensive system of high-
way carrier regulation, providing distinctive permits and cer-
tificates for contract and common carriers, and authorizing the
refusal of permits to contract carriers when existing service by
common carriers in the same territory is sufficient. In the opin-
ion of the court the statute avoids the constitutional objections
made by the Supreme Court in the Frost case 21 and, more re-
2 As to whether the power to regulate may be so exercised as to compel
the discontinuance of a business not objectionable per se, see the discussion
in the majority and dissenting opinions in Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590,
37 Sup. Ct. 662 (1917) which invalidated a statute prohibiting the taking
of fees from those seeking employment. Quacre as to the authority of
Adams v. Tanner in the case of statutes in which the prohibition is directed
at a less essential aspect of the business.
22 52 F. (2d) 730 (S. D. Texas 1931, decided Sept. 30), aff'd by United
States Supreme Court, U. S. Daily, May 24, 1932, at 566.
23 TExAs GENERAL LAWS 1931, c. 282, § 3 (f). "One is reminded of a catch
question, frequently propounded in childhood days, of which is the heavier,
a pound of lead or a pound of feathers." Sproles v. Binford, supra note 22,
at 736. However, bulk as well as weight may properly be considered as a
factor in regulatory measures designed to secure the safe movement of
traffic.
2 4 TxAs GENERAL LAws 1931, c. 277.
-553 F. (2d) 509 (S. D. Texas 1931, decided Oct. 26).
26 Frost v. Commission, 271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605 (1926).
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cently, in Smith v. Cahoon 27 to regulatory statutes which fail to
distinguish adequately between common and contract carriers. It
does not appear that any cotton truckers intervened in this liti-
gation, but that their interests are involved is apparent and
under one section 28 giving the commission power to fix the char-
acter of tonnage which may be hauled and the number and size
of boxes or bales of any particular commodity to be transported,
requirements similar to those disapproved in Sproles v. Binford
might be attempted. If so, the likelihood of successful resistance
by appeal to the courts would be small, not only because the
courts generally treat as final the action of an administrative
body in determining the question of public convenience or neces-
sity involved in granting or withholding a permit, when discre-
tion so to do has once been validly delegated,20 but because, even
when the action is open to challenge on the ground of bias and
"abuse" of discretion, the difficulties of proof for the individual
applicants affected are extreme. Whether the statute itself will
continue to withstand challenge 10 remains somewhat doubtful
27 Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 51 Sup. Ct. 582 (1931).
28 § 14.
29 See generally: FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND
PROPERTY (1928) § 155; Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Administrativo
Action (1921) 35 H~av L. REV. 127, 134-6; Wiel, Administrativo Finality
(1925) 38 HARev. L. REv. 447, 445-463. When the administrative body has
discretion to grant a certificate of public convenience of necessity, the court
will not substitute its judgment for that of the commission. Lake Shore
Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 119 Ohio St. 61, 162 N. 1. 279
(1928); Appeal of Beasley Bros., 206 Iowa 229, 220 N. W. 306 (1928);
Denman v. Dep't of Public Works, 157 Wash. 447, 289 Pac. 34 (1930);
Black Bus Line v. Henry, 241 Ky. 602, 44 S. W. (2d) 580 (1931). Cf. Sea-
board Air Line Ry. v. Wells, 100 Fla. 1631, 131 So. 777 (1931) (order
quashed because commission under misconstruction of statute failed to con-
sider railway transportation facilities in the territory). But if the record
shows that the commission departed from its own conclusion and granted
the certificate because of other factors, the order will be reversed. Stark
Electric R. Co. v. Public Utility Commission of Ohio, 121 Ohio St. 550, 170
N. E. 360 (1930), cert. den. 51 Sup. Ct. 24. In order to avoid objection under
the due process clause, statutes generally provide that as to carriers already
operating the granting of a certificate is conditional only on compliance
with certain requirements. In such case the court proceeding on appeal
may be a trial de novo and the opinion of the commission important only
as showing the ground on which it based its action. Railroad Commission
of Texas v. Rau, 45 S. W. 413 (Texas 1931). So also if the statute provides
that an action to set aside an order may be brought within a time limit, to
be tried like other civil actions. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Pub. Service
Com., 130 Kan. 777, 288 Pac. 755 (1930).
The determination, by a commission acting within statutory powers, of
public convenience and necessity invoked in granting a certificate is a legis-
lative function and objection that the service would or would not promote
public convenience presents no judicial question. Appeal of Beasley Bros.,
supra at 229, 220 N. W. at 309.
3o Enforcement of the statute has been enjoined as to interstate contract
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under the views expressed by the Supreme Court in Nezu State
Ice Co. v. Liebroa -1 relative to permits conditioned upon con-
siderations of public expediency.32
In determining the validity of statutes or ordinances, such as
those at issue in the Texas highway or in the Camnpbell and
Hoffman cases it is of course immaterial that an enactment tax-
ing or regulating one business may have the effect of giving an
artificial economic advantage to another. The power to select
and classify cannot be exercised without discrimination, and the
process of selection is necessarily governed by considerations of
public policy of which the legislative body is the appropriate
judge 33 when the businesses affected lie wholly within its juris-
diction. A very different element enters when classifications are
so drawn that they distinguish between residents and non-resi-
dents. In this case special burdens are imposed upon non-resi-
dents by a legislature in which their interests are entirely un-
represented, and in which the lArger public interest involved in
the free flow of trade across local boundaries cannot be fairly
weighed. Against such discriminations, arbitrary because not
subject to democratic control, protection can be afforded only by
the courts, and the admission of classifications, under whatever
form of words, which discriminate on the basis of residence
seems highly regrettable.
carriers, to the extent of the sections requiring permits, bonds, and the
making of reports to the commission. Sage v. Baldwin, 55 F. (2d) 968 (N.
. Texas 1932).
3152 Sup. Ct. 371 (1932).
32 The strongest ground for upholding the statute -would seem to be the
right of the state to deny the use of the highways to carriers for hire and
therefore to condition their use. That this conditioning of the use of state
highways is not banned by previous Supreme Court decisions is the view
of the court in Stephenson v. Binford, 516-517. See also Comment, supra
note 4.
33 That the power to tax may be used as an instrument of economic con-
trol is more than ever clear since the decisions in the chain store case.
State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct.
540 (1931).
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